The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal Access to Federal Courts by Sack, Emily J.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 6 
2006 
The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal 
Access to Federal Courts 
Emily J. Sack 
Roger Williams University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, Family Law Commons, Jurisdiction 
Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal Access to Federal Courts, 
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441 (2006). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1441 
THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND EQUAL ACCESS  
TO FEDERAL COURTS 
EMILY J. SACK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the classic issue of the allocation of jurisdiction 
between the state and federal courts, with an untraditional focus on family 
law, domestic violence, and women’s access to federal courts. The piece 
first explores the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, a 
longstanding judge-created doctrine under which the federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to hear divorce, custody, and other family matters 
traditionally reserved to the states. In the recent case of Marshall v. 
Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006), the Supreme Court had the opportunity 
to abandon the domestic relations exception (as well as its relative, the 
probate exception) but refused to do so, despite acknowledging the weak 
rationale for maintaining it. This Article critiques the traditional 
explanations for the exception’s existence, and argues that its roots may 
be traced to the principles of coverture. The “exception” may in fact not 
be an exception to jurisdiction at all, but rather a recognition that divorce 
and related cases could not meet federal diversity requirements because 
married women could not establish citizenship separate from that of their 
husbands. This explanation reveals both one of the primary causes for the 
exception’s creation and the consequences of maintaining it—the belief 
that family law is a “women’s issue” that is not deserving of the attention 
of the federal courts.  
The Article goes on to suggest that the legacy of the exception can be 
seen in the Court’s treatment of domestic violence cases. It focuses 
primarily on Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), which held 
that a domestic violence victim had no constitutionally protected property 
interest in the enforcement of a protection order, and therefore no claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In so doing, the Court has again restricted 
federal court review of issues that centrally concern women. The Article 
 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A., Swarthmore 
College; J.D., New York University School of Law. I am grateful to my colleagues at Roger Williams, 
as well as my co-panelists at the 2006 Law and Society conference for their very helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this Article. I also would like to thank my research assistants, Craig Raysor, 
Margreta Vellucci, and Anna Wislocki, for their excellent work on this project.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1441 Sack book pages.doc10/2/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1442 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1441 
 
 
 
 
concludes that the domestic relations exception should be abolished as a 
significant first step. However, the Supreme Court must also recognize 
that in its denial of federal rights to victims of domestic violence, it is 
continuing to deny all women full participation and citizenship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Anna Nicole Smith’s case against E. Pierce Marshall arrived at 
the Supreme Court, it is safe to say that public attention was not focused 
on the potential effect that the decision would have on a little known 
exclusion from federal court jurisdiction, the domestic relations 
exception.1 However, the central issue in the case was whether Smith’s 
tort claim, which alleged that Marshall had interfered with her expectancy 
in the estate of her late husband, could be heard by a federal court.2 
Because Smith’s claim was related to the probate of her husband’s estate, 
Marshall claimed that it fell within the probate exception to federal 
jurisdiction, under which claims concerning the administration of an estate 
or probate of a will are considered to be the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
state courts.3 The probate exception is “kin” to the domestic relations 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Gina Holland, Anna Nicole’s Case Goes to Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Sept. 27, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/09/27/national/w063657D29 
.DTL (“The Supreme Court shed its staid image Tuesday, giving stripper-turned Playboy model Anna 
Nicole Smith a new chance at a piece of the fortune of her 90-year-old late husband . . . . The case 
promises to be the sexiest of the nine-month term which begins next week.”). After the Court ruled in 
her favor, a sample headline read, “Anna Nicole Smith wins over justices.” See Bill Mears, Anna 
Nicole Smith wins over justices, CNN, May 1, 2006, http://cnn.com/2006/LAW/05/01/scotus.smith/ 
index.html. As these examples demonstrate, this depiction of the case was prevalent in mainstream 
news coverage and was not limited to entertainment or gossip sites. 
 2.  Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006). Anna Nicole Smith was also known as Vickie 
Lynn Marshall (“Vickie”). While her husband’s estate was pending in a Texas probate court, Vickie 
filed for bankruptcy in a federal bankruptcy court in California. E. Pierce Marshall (“Pierce”) 
subsequently filed a proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy proceeding, alleging that Vickie had 
defamed him and seeking a declaration that the debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie filed 
a tortious interference counterclaim against Pierce. Id. at 1741–42. The bankruptcy court ultimately 
ruled for Vickie both on Pierce’s claim and on her counterclaim. Pierce then filed a post-trial motion in 
bankruptcy court, arguing that the probate exception prohibited the federal court from hearing Vickie’s 
counterclaim. The bankruptcy court held that the probate exception argument was not timely, but also 
that this claim would not fall within the exception. Id. at 1742. On appeal, the federal district court 
rejected the time-barred argument but agreed that the probation exception did not apply to Vickie’s tort 
claim and ruled for Vickie on that claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the Vickie’s claim 
fell within the probate exception. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1743–44. 
 3. Courts and commentators traditionally trace the origins of the probate exception to the 
jurisdiction of the English ecclesiastical courts at the time that the Judiciary Act of 1789, defining 
jurisdiction in the federal courts, was enacted. Because the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction of probate of wills at that time, these issues were not included in the Act’s grant of federal 
jurisdiction to “all suits of a civil nature at common law or equity.” Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 
713 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); see also Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2002) (Judiciary 
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exception, in which federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear divorce, 
custody, and other family matters traditionally reserved for the state 
courts.4 In Marshall, the Court discussed the domestic relations exception 
at length for the first time in fourteen years.5  
The opinion began with Chief Justice Marshall’s famous quote from 
Cohens v. Virginia, which asserted the federal courts’ responsibility to 
adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction: “It is most true that this Court 
will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must 
take jurisdiction, if it should. . . . We have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given.”6 The Court in Marshall displayed a heavily skeptical view of the 
probate and domestic relations exceptions to federal jurisdiction, referring 
to them as “so-called” exceptions, asserting that they were required neither 
by the Constitution nor federal statute, and stating that they stemmed “in 
large measure from misty understandings of English legal history.”7 The 
Court characterized its prior decisions as “rein[ing] in” the exceptions and 
chastised the Ninth Circuit for giving a broad reading to the probate 
exception in this case.8 Nevertheless, despite this strong language, the 
Court did not take the opportunity to overrule either exception.9  
This Article focuses on the domestic relations exception to federal 
jurisdiction and both explores and critiques the traditional explanations for 
 
 
Act of 1789’s conferral of equity jurisdiction is limited to the scope of jurisdiction of the English 
Chancery Court at that time, which did not include probate matters.). Judge Posner criticized this 
rationale both because it may not be historically accurate, and because there is no reason for the 
Judiciary Act to be interpreted in reference to the jurisdiction of English courts. Dragan, 679 F.2d at 
713. He termed the probate exception “one of the most mysterious and esoteric branches of the law of 
federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 713. 
 4. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1746. This historical rationale is similar to that provided to explain 
the domestic relations exception. See infra text accompanying notes 26–32; see also Jones v. Brennan, 
465 F.3d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the source of authority for both the probate and domestic 
relations exceptions); Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the 
probate and domestic relations exceptions together, as both involving areas in which states and 
localities have a particular interest and competence). 
 5. The Court’s most recent case directly addressing the domestic relations exception is 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), where the Court narrowly defined the exception to 
include only direct actions for divorce, alimony, and child custody, but did not overrule it entirely. 504 
U.S. at 703–04; see infra text accompanying notes 18–58. 
 6. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1741 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). 
 7. Id. at 1741. 
 8. Id. (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (domestic relations exception) and 
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946) (probate exception)). 
 9. The Court construed the probate exception narrowly, and found that because Smith’s claim 
did not involve a purely probate matter, such as probate of a will or administration of an estate, but 
rather was a tort claim in which she sought an in personam judgment, the exception did not apply. Id. 
at 1748. Justice Stevens concurred, arguing against the existence of any probate exception at all. Id. at 
1750 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
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its existence. Through a close analysis of the case law in which the 
exception was established, I propose an alternative rationale for its 
creation that is based in the principles of coverture.10 I argue that the 
domestic relations “exception” may in fact not be an exception at all, but 
rather a recognition that divorce and other related cases could not meet the 
requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction because married women 
could not establish citizenship separate from that of their husbands. This 
alternative explanation has been ignored by the Court in intervening years 
because it reveals the exception’s now-discredited beginnings and exposes 
one of the primary causes and consequences of the exception—the belief 
that family law is a “women’s issue” that is not deserving of the attention 
of the federal courts.  
In Part I, I analyze Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme Court’s most 
recent attempt to define the scope of the domestic relations exception. I 
critique the rationales suggested by the Court, and conclude that it has not 
espoused any convincing explanation for this exception to federal court 
jurisdiction. However, by articulating several policy rationales for 
maintaining the exception, and by suggesting that abstention may be 
appropriate in some situations where the exception to jurisdiction does not 
apply, the Ankenbrandt Court sustained, and may have strengthened, the 
concept that family law cases do not belong in federal court. In this Part, I 
briefly review lower federal court case law both before and after 
Ankenbrandt, and conclude that the federal courts’ use of the exception 
has been inconsistent, but remarkably enduring.  
In Part II, I examine the Court’s early case law establishing the 
domestic relations exception and the various rationales provided in these 
foundational cases. I conclude that the “exception” may be best explained 
as a description of the inability to establish diversity in divorce and 
alimony cases, primarily because at the time of these early cases a married 
woman could not establish a domicile separate from that of her husband, 
even in order to bring an action for divorce or alimony. However, more 
modern cases have avoided such an explanation because it is so obviously 
outdated; an exception to jurisdiction on this basis would have to be 
abandoned. Instead, the more recent cases have tried, unsuccessfully, to 
 
 
 10. Under coverture, a woman had no legal existence upon marriage; she and her husband were 
considered one entity, that being the husband. She had no legal ability to contract or buy or sell 
property without her husband’s consent. The classic description of coverture is that of William 
Blackstone: “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing . . . .” 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *42. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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justify the exception on grounds relating to the jurisdiction of the English 
courts and the interpretation of the congressional statute conferring 
diversity jurisdiction on the federal courts.  
Left without any convincing rationale for the domestic relations 
exception, the federal courts have relied upon policy factors in support of 
maintaining it. In Part III, I review these policies and conclude that none 
of them offer a persuasive justification for continuing the domestic 
relations exception. Moreover, many of the policy arguments are circular. 
Their reasoning is based on the premise that the federal courts should defer 
to the states in this area of particular state interest and expertise; but the 
states’ interest and expertise have developed simply because the federal 
courts have not been willing to hear these cases. I argue that by 
maintaining the exception, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts 
have perpetuated the view that domestic relations issues, which they 
perceive as issues relating to women, are not worthy of national focus. 
While coverture formally denied women access to the courts, the domestic 
relations exception continues to limit their access to the federal courts and 
therefore the full political participation that defines equal citizenship. I 
conclude this Part by arguing that the exception, as well as the broad use 
of abstention in domestic relations cases, should be discarded, both 
because they lack any justification and because of their consequences for 
women’s equality. 
In Part IV, I explore how the Court’s view of “women’s issues” that 
underlies the domestic relations exception also has implications for its 
treatment of domestic violence cases, another area viewed primarily as a 
women’s concern. I examine how the Court has equated and intertwined 
domestic violence with domestic relations as a way of domesticating and 
localizing this violence. In addition, by studying the Court’s analysis in 
United States v. Morrison and Castle Rock v. Gonzales, I suggest that in 
the modern era, domestic violence may carry on the legacy of the 
outmoded domestic relations exception by revealing the federal courts’ 
continuing desire to keep issues involving women off the federal docket. 
In the Conclusion to the Article, I argue that we must continue to advocate 
for the rejection of the domestic relations exception, and must also 
monitor and critique the Court’s continuation of the exception’s principles 
in another guise—its treatment of domestic violence. The Court’s 
traditional handling of domestic relations matters, and its more recent 
consideration of domestic violence cases, are both rooted in the historical 
principles of coverture, and both result in the denial of women’s equal 
access to the federal courts. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
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I. THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION: ANKENBRANDT V. RICHARDS 
AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS  
It may seem odd that the domestic relations exception remains an issue 
because, in fact, the federal courts have become involved in numerous 
domestic relations matters. Congress has utilized its power under the 
Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to regulate enormous areas of family law, and the federal courts 
regularly review and interpret this legislation.11 A significant amount of 
federal law is explicitly devoted to issues such as child welfare, custody, 
and child support.12 Legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act 
 
 
 11. See Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a Quest for Policy, 33 
FAM. L.Q. 843, 846, 848 (1999) (discussing how federal legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and 
international treaties have federalized and internationalized many areas of family law during the 
twentieth century); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 827–29, 
870–92 (2004) (analyzing how orthodoxy of family law canon that family law is local has led judges, 
legislators, and scholars to overlook substantial areas affecting the family that are covered by federal 
law); Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support—A Shift in the Ruling Paradigm: Child 
Support as Outside the Contours of “Family Law,” 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 195 (1999) 
(Despite the Supreme Court’s stated position that family law is not a subject for federal legislation or 
federal court jurisdiction, “the federalization of child support continues apace.”); see also Kansas v. 
United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196, 1199 (D. Kan. 1998) (granting federal government’s motion 
to dismiss State’s claim that federal law on child support collection was unconstitutional under the 
Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment and noting Congress’s extensive use of conditional offers 
of federal funds to regulate state actions). Congress has enacted legislation affecting family social 
policy since the nineteenth century. See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition 
of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1782–83, 1801 
(2005) (Congress decided which families and family members were pension-eligible, the value of the 
widow’s service in raising the next generation, and how a widow’s current marital status impacted her 
ability to receive a pension.).  
 12. See, e.g., International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006); Child 
Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006); Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738B (2006); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Opportunities Act of 
1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701–709 (2006); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 670 (2006); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–07 (2006); Child Support 
Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of Title 42 of the U.S. Code); Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 666–
667 (2006); Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (1998); 
Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VI, 110 Stat. 2935, 
2936 (1996). These laws are the subject of extensive litigation in the federal courts. See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179–87 (1988) (considering whether the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act created an implied right of action in federal court to determine the validity of 
conflicting state custody orders); United States v. Kerley, 416 F.3d 176, 178–81 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(evaluating whether defendants charged with violating the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act could 
collaterally challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the state court that entered the underlying child 
support order); ASW v. Oregon, 424 F.3d 970, 974–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering whether plaintiffs 
have a right to make a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act); 
United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1048–51 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining constitutionality of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996 has substantially impacted family law issues.13 Congress also has 
become involved in the regulation of marriage.14 Other federal laws 
governing bankruptcy and pensions affect the rights of family members to 
property and maintenance at divorce.15 Moreover, there are a number of 
constitutional issues that involve family law, and since the Court’s 
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,16 this area has been among the most 
rapidly developing fields of constitutional law.17 However, the domestic 
relations exception has lived on in federal courts’ jurisprudence. 
 
 
the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act as valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power); United States v. Kramer, 225 F.3d 847, 850–57 (7th Cir. 2000) (interpreting the Child Support 
Recovery Act to determine whether a defendant may challenge on collateral attack a state default 
judgment entered without personal jurisdiction).  
 13. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (addressing 
employment leave for child care and family illness); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2), (g) (2006) (creating incentives that impact family 
size, requiring states to adopt various child support enforcement measures in order to receive federal 
welfare funds, and replacing the AFDC program with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) block grants); see also Morgan, supra note 11, at 210–11. 
 14. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended 
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). Congress has also considered a Marriage Protection 
Amendment to the Constitution as recently as the summer of 2006. See H.R.J. Res. 88, 109th Cong. 
(2006); 152 CONG. REC. H5287 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (debate and vote on Marriage Protection 
Amendment). 
 15. Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (2006); The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974); see Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: 
Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 415–16 (2002) 
[hereinafter Reconstructing Equality] (discussing how federal tax law defines household heads, 
benefits law and bankruptcy law detail family relations and obligations of support, pension law 
governs marital property rights in pensions, and federal immigration and asylum law defines families 
for those purposes).  
 16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that right of married couples to use contraception is protected 
under the Constitution). 
 17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that state statute criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy violated substantive due process required under Constitution); Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (finding state statute on third-party visitation, which gave no priority to 
the decision of a fit parent, unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) (reaffirming Roe framework, holding husband notification provision unconstitutional, and 
upholding other provisions that the Court found did not place an undue burden on the right to seek an 
abortion); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that statute, which conclusively 
presumed that the husband of a woman who gives birth to child during marriage is the child’s father, 
did not violate a putative father’s due process rights); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding 
that racial classification cannot be the basis for removing a child from the custody of a parent found to 
be an appropriate person to have such custody); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that 
natural father’s constitutional rights were not violated when he failed to receive notice and opportunity 
to be heard on adoption of his child, where he had never had any significant relationship with the 
child); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that Due Process Clause requires at least a 
clear and convincing standard of proof in a parental termination proceeding); Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that state statute permitting unwed mother, but not unwed father, to 
block adoption of child by withholding consent violated the Equal Protection Clause); Zablocki v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
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A. Ankenbrandt v. Richards 
The Supreme Court’s most recent direct pronouncement on the 
domestic relations exception was in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,18 in which a 
mother sued on behalf of the children she shared with her ex-husband, 
claiming that he and his girlfriend had physically and sexually abused the 
children.19 The diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy 
requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction were satisfied.20 The federal 
district court had dismissed the case, holding that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction due to the domestic relations exception, and alternatively, 
because the case fell within the Younger abstention doctrine.21 The Court 
of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.22 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the domestic relations 
exception did not apply to the case, nor was abstention appropriate. 
However, the Court reviewed the rationale for the exception, and despite 
its own skeptical explanation of its origins, did not overrule the doctrine. 
Rather, it was “unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been 
recognized for nearly a century and a half” and so felt “compelled to 
 
 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that statute which substantially infringed on right to marry 
violated Equal Protection Clause); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that unwed 
father’s rights were not violated by statute that permitted adoption under a best interests of the child 
standard, and distinguished between married and unwed fathers); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494 (1977) (holding housing ordinance which limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to only 
certain family relations unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to 
choose abortion is a fundamental right protected under the Due Process Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that state law compelling Amish parents to cause their children to attend 
school to age sixteen violates the Free Exercise Clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 
(holding state presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional). 
 18. 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
 19. Id. at 691. 
 20. Id. Ankenbrandt alleged that the father’s parental rights had already been terminated in state 
court. Id. at 691 n.1. 
 21. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court held that the federal court was barred 
from hearing a federal civil rights claim when the plaintiff in that action was currently being 
prosecuted on a charge relating to that claim in a state criminal proceeding. The doctrine has been 
extended to situations in which a state civil action is pending that involves a state action to execute a 
civil fine, or an action for contempt of court. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Middlesex County 
Ethics Committee, the Court held that Younger abstention required that state proceedings were pending 
that implicated important state interests, and that provided an adequate opportunity for raising federal 
constitutional claims. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432. Younger precludes a federal 
court from enjoining a pending state court proceeding unless plaintiff shows that he is the victim of 
official bad faith or harassment, or that the state is acting pursuant to a patently unconstitutional state 
statute. Younger, 401 U.S. at 49, 53. 
 22. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 692. 
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explain why we will continue to recognize this limitation on federal 
jurisdiction.”23  
The Court first made clear that the domestic relations exception was 
not constitutionally based, and that the three terms used to delineate 
jurisdiction in Article III, “Cases, in Law and Equity,” “Cases,” and 
“Controversies,” did not include any exception for domestic relations 
matters.24 Moreover, the Court’s prior case law did not rely on the 
Constitution for the domestic relations limitation. Finally, the fact that the 
Court heard appeals from territorial courts, and upheld the exercise of 
original jurisdiction in the federal courts in the District of Columbia in 
these matters, made clear that the exception was not required by the 
Constitution.25  
Therefore, Congress could have limited the lower federal courts’ 
jurisdiction by statute. This argument was made by the dissent in Barber v. 
Barber,26 the case whose unsupported dicta provided the “seeming 
authority” for the domestic relations exception.27 The Barber dissent 
argued that at the time Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which 
determined the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction, certain 
domestic relations matters were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English ecclesiastical courts and could not be heard in the English 
chancery courts.28 When using the language “suits of a civil nature at 
common law or in equity” to define diversity jurisdiction, the dissent 
opined, Congress intended to limit American chancery court jurisdiction to 
that available in the English courts; therefore, these domestic relations 
 
 
 23. Id. at 694–95. 
 24. Id. at 695; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This clause reads:  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—
to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and 
Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the 
same state claiming Land under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
 25. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 695–97. 
 26. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). 
 27. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 693. In particular: 
The domestic relations exception upon which the courts below relied to decline jurisdiction 
has been invoked often by the lower federal courts. The seeming authority for doing so 
stemmed from the announcement in Barber v. Barber that the federal courts have no 
jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 28. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
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matters would not fall within the language of the Judiciary Act.29 The 
Ankenbrandt Court acknowledged that this reference by the Barber 
dissenters was only “implicit” and “suggested.”30  
The Ankenbrandt Court then reasoned that the Barber majority must 
have agreed with the dissent’s rationale for the domestic relations 
exception because it “did not disagree” with this explanation; accordingly, 
“it may be inferred fairly that the jurisdictional limitation recognized by 
the Court rested on this statutory basis.”31 Moreover, though Congress 
changed the language of the diversity statute in 1948 to remove the law 
and equity categories, and replace them with the words “all civil actions,” 
the Court found that there was no evidence that Congress intended to 
reject the courts’ longstanding interpretation of the statute by eliminating 
the domestic relations exception.32  
In making this strained explication of the legal basis for the exception, 
the Court acknowledged that the underlying argument regarding 
jurisdiction of the chancery courts in England might not even be 
historically accurate.33 Several well-respected judges in the lower federal 
courts had argued before Ankenbrandt that the historical explanation 
regarding the jurisdiction of the English chancery courts was unsound. In 
Spindel v. Spindel,34 Judge Weinstein reviewed the jurisdictional history 
and concluded that “[t]he historical reasons relied upon to explain the 
 
 
 29. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 698–99; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73,78 
(1789) (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several 
States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, 
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or the suit is 
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”). In 1875, 
Congress deleted the requirement that one of the parties must be a citizen of the forum state. See 
Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 30. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 698 (“The Barber majority itself did not expressly refer to the 
diversity statute’s use of the limitation on ‘suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.’ The 
dissenters in Barber, however, implicitly made such a reference, for they suggested that the federal 
courts had no power over certain domestic relations actions because the court of chancery lacked 
authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees.”). 
 31. Id. at 699. The Supreme Court here noted that in Barber the Court had not referred to the 
diversity statute’s language to justify the domestic relations exception. Id. at 698. 
 32. Id. at 700–01; 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930 (1948) (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)). Barbara Atwood points out that, though there is no indication that Congress 
intended to alter its understanding of the domestic relations exception when it changed this language, 
with the deletion of the reference to the categories of “law” and “equity,” the historic rationale “lost its 
literal foundation.” Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a 
Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 587 (1984). The “all civil actions” 
language remains in the current diversity statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (“The district court shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 
of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between—(1) Citizens of different states.”). 
 33. Atwood, supra note 32, at 699–700. 
 34. 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Weinstein, J.). 
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federal courts’ complete lack of matrimonial jurisdiction are not 
convincing.”35 He argued that the jurisdiction of the English ecclesiastical 
courts was only exclusive in theory, and that the temporal courts had 
always exercised jurisdiction “in a broad range of ancillary matters,” such 
as the determination of marital status, if it was necessary to deciding the 
matter at hand.36 The chancery courts would also assist the ecclesiastical 
courts in matters involving marital status and would enforce various 
domestic relations orders, including separation agreements.37 Further, the 
chancery courts would “restrain the church tribunals from exceeding their 
jurisdiction.”38 
Moreover, as Judge Posner argued in Lloyd v. Loeffler,39 there is no 
good reason why “the proper referent is English rather than American 
practice, though if only because there was no ecclesiastical court in 
America, American law and equity courts had a broader jurisdiction in 
family-law matters than their English counterparts had.”40 Judge Posner 
also noted that “it would be odd if the jurisdiction of England’s 
ecclesiastical courts, theocratic institutions unlikely to be well regarded in 
America, should have been thought to define the limits of the jurisdiction 
of the new federal courts.”41 
 
 
 35. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 806. Several commentators also have questioned the accuracy of the 
historical rationale. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 32, at 584–85 (“[T]he jurisdictional divisions in the 
English system, viewed as rigid barriers under the historical rationale, were in fact far from 
absolute.”); Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 
1089–90 (1994); Mark Stephen Poker, Comment, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Domestic 
Relations Exception, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 159–60 (1987) (Chancery court had “significant, if 
limited jurisdiction over domestic matters,” such as enforcing separation agreements and deciding 
validity of marriages.). But see Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction 
and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 15 & n.68 (1984) (arguing that the 
few family relations cases heard in the chancery courts were anomalies due to historical events, such 
as during Cromwell’s rule in the mid-seventeenth century, when the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical 
courts was temporarily suspended). 
 36. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 807; see also Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(Posner, J.) (The historical account “exaggerates the nicety with which the jurisdictional distinctions 
among the English courts were observed.”); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“The myth of a broad exception to the judicial power of the United States 
with respect to questions of ‘domestic relations’ was exposed completely and finally by Judge 
Weinstein’s opinion in Spindel.”).  
 37. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 808. In Barber, itself an enforcement case, the Supreme Court had 
explained that enforcement of domestic relations orders was not outside the jurisdiction of the English 
chancery courts. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 590–91 (1858). 
 38. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 809. 
 39. 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). 
 40. Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 492. Commentators have also made this point. See Atwood, supra note 32, 
at 586–87; Cahn, supra note 35, at 1090.  
 41. Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 492. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
p 1441 Sack book pages.doc10/2/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] EQUAL ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS 1453 
 
 
 
 
Despite the shaky foundation of the exception, the Ankenbrandt Court 
stated that it was “content to rest our conclusion that a domestic relations 
exception exists as a matter of statutory construction not on the accuracy 
of the historical justification on which it was seemingly based, but rather 
on Congress’ apparent acceptance of this construction” of the Judiciary 
Act.42 Congress’ long acceptance of the Court’s interpretation, together 
with considerations of stare decisis, led the Court to uphold the 
exception’s existence. The Court bolstered its support for the exception on 
the basis of policy considerations, and cited several factors traditionally 
invoked to justify the exception: state courts’ greater expertise in family 
law issues, and state courts’ increased ability both to work with local 
agencies and to undertake the ongoing monitoring that is often required in 
family law cases.43 
The Court did stress that the domestic relations exception was limited 
to the issuance or modification of a divorce, alimony, or child custody 
decree, and disapproved of some lower federal courts’ broad invocation of 
the exception.44 The Court held that the domestic relations exception did 
not apply in the present case because it was a tort action, which did not 
seek such a decree.45 The Court also rejected the lower courts’ reliance on 
Younger abstention in this case as an alternative basis for dismissal.46 The 
Court found that Younger abstention did not apply when there was no state 
court proceeding pending and no “assertion of important state interests.”47  
Yet the Court did not find abstention completely inapplicable in 
domestic relations cases. It noted that even where the federal courts did 
not lack jurisdiction due to the domestic relations exception, “it is not 
inconceivable . . . that in certain circumstances, the abstention principles 
developed in Burford v. Sun Oil Co. might be relevant.”48 The Court 
specified that Burford abstention might be appropriate if a federal suit 
were filed prior to the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody 
decree and the federal suit depended on a determination of the status of the 
parties, because the case then could present “difficult questions of state 
 
 
 42. Ankenbrant v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700 (1992). 
 43. Id. at 703–04. 
 44. Id. at 701–03. The Court endorsed the Courts of Appeals opinions that had taken a narrow 
view of the exception. See id. at 703 n.6. 
 45. Id. at 704.  
 46. Id. at 705. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (citation omitted); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burford abstention 
permits a federal court sitting in diversity to abstain when federal court involvement would unduly 
disrupt state policy in a complex regulatory field. Id. at 332–34.  
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law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose 
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.”49  
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the 
Court’s holding on the existence of the domestic relations exception to 
federal court jurisdiction.50 He argued at length that both the federal 
diversity statute and prior Supreme Court case law did not provide a basis 
for the mandatory limitation on federal subject matter jurisdiction that the 
majority upheld.51 Yet Justice Blackmun did not disagree with the idea 
that the federal courts need not hear domestic relations matters. Instead, 
Justice Blackmun found the necessary basis for “the federal courts’ 
longstanding practice of declining to hear certain domestic relations cases” 
in abstention principles.52 Though the Court had not yet developed a 
formal abstention doctrine in its early cases regarding domestic relations, 
according to Justice Blackmun, its refusal to hear domestic relations 
matters in prior cases was best explained by abstention-like concerns due 
to “the virtually exclusive primacy at that time of the States in the 
regulation of domestic relations.”53  
Justice Blackmun frankly acknowledged that “[w]hether the interest of 
States remains a sufficient justification today for abstention is uncertain in 
view of the expansion in recent years of federal law in the domestic 
relations area.”54 Nonetheless, the federal courts’ refusal to hear these 
cases for so long itself provides the “very rare justification for continuing 
to do so.”55 Like the majority, Justice Blackmun provided policy rationales 
to support this position, focusing on state expertise and the existence of 
state institutions specialized in these matters. He concluded with a broad 
call for abstention: “Absent a contrary command of Congress, the federal 
courts properly should abstain, at least from diversity actions traditionally 
excluded from the federal courts, such as those seeking divorce, alimony, 
and child custody.”56 After his devastating critique of the majority’s 
justification for maintaining the domestic relations exception, Justice 
 
 
 49. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705–06 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)). The Court found that this situation did not exist in the present case, 
so Burford abstention did not apply. Id. at 706. 
 50. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 707 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 51. Id. at 707–13. 
 52. Id. at 713–14. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 715. 
 55. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that federal courts have a “disinclination to entertain domestic 
relations matters.” Id. at 716. 
 56. Id. at 715. Justice Blackmun found that abstention was not appropriate in the case at bar, 
which was only peripherally connected to domestic relations issues. Id. at 716. 
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Blackmun ultimately reached the same result—restricting domestic 
relations litigants from access to federal courts—through his own thinly 
justified abstention rationale.57  
The Court thus gave conflicting signals in Ankenbrandt regarding the 
exception. It claimed to be interpreting the exception narrowly and 
rejected its use in the tort action before it. It also rejected the use of 
Younger abstention in the case, which had provided a means for the 
federal courts to use their discretion to dismiss domestic relations cases in 
certain circumstances. Yet it also explicitly acknowledged the existence of 
the domestic relations exception and suggested a possible use of Burford 
abstention when the exception did not apply. It stretched to find a rationale 
for the exception, of which it barely seemed to convince itself, in order to 
justify its continuance. Most striking, no member of the Court questioned 
the basic assumptions justifying federal courts’ refusal to hear domestic 
relations cases, whether through the exception or abstention. Nor did any 
Justice consider the impact that such refusal has had on the litigants in 
these cases. Moreover, Ankenbrandt did nothing to clear up the confusion 
over the scope and rationale for the domestic relations exception that had 
existed in the lower federal courts.58 In the following section, I briefly 
review the confused state of affairs in the lower federal courts both before 
and after Ankenbrandt. 
B. The Lower Federal Courts’ Use of the Domestic Relations Exception  
The lower federal courts have taken widely divergent positions on the 
domestic relations exception in a variety of contexts. Without adequate 
guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts’ decisions have been 
inconsistent both within and between circuits.59 With the exception of 
 
 
 57. Justice Stevens, also concurring in the judgment, would have preferred for the Court not to 
consider the existence, origin, or scope of a domestic relations exception at all. He argued that the case 
at issue did not fall within any exception that might exist, so that no further discussion was necessary 
and should be left for another day. Id. at 718 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 58. See Atwood, supra note 32, at 592 (“The ambiguities in Supreme Court precedent on the 
domestic relations exception have left the lower courts without a sure compass.”); Cahn, supra note 
35, at 1076 (Even before Ankenbrandt, “federal court jurisprudence on the origins and scope of the 
Exception was muddled.”); Thomas H. Dobbs, The Domestic Relations Exception is Narrowed After 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1145 (1993) (Prior to Ankenbrandt, “[w]ith 
no guidance on the interpretation of the ambiguities of Supreme Court precedent, the lower courts 
struggled to define the parameters of the exception.”); see also Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic 
Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 
B.C. L. REV. 669, 671 (1995). 
 59. For example, some commentators and courts have identified various tests for the domestic 
relations exception, including: cases involving modifiable orders; claims involving relationship status, 
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some core domestic relations issues—direct consideration of a divorce, 
alimony, or custody decree—the courts have not acted with any 
predictability.60  
1. Domestic Relations Cases in the Lower Federal Courts Before 
Ankenbrandt 
Prior to Ankenbrandt, some lower federal courts interpreted the 
domestic relations exception broadly and dismissed cases involving family 
relations, even if the claims were based in contract61 or tort.62 Some courts 
 
 
as opposed to property rights; and “the nature of the case,” an approach in which the court looks 
behind the label placed on the claim, such as tort or contract, to discern what issue is really in question. 
See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal & David L. Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1956); Barbara Freedman Wand, A Call for the Repudiation 
of the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 VILL. L. REV. 307, 328–35 (1985); 
Poker, supra note 35, at 151. The argument is that federal courts will not hear cases involving 
obligations that may be modified, such as future alimony or child support, because they may cause the 
courts to monitor a domestic relations matter on an ongoing basis. The federal courts could refuse to 
consider matters that require a determination of status, such as the validity of a marriage or divorce, or 
a paternity claim. However, they are able to decide a property dispute between family members. In the 
“nature of the case” approach, the courts look to the actual issue rather than simply to the label of the 
cause of action. However, not all federal courts apply these approaches and categories, nor are they 
applied consistently where they are used. See Atwood, supra note 32, at 594–96 (critiquing various 
tests and arguing that they are not based in any Supreme Court case law). 
 60. Writing before Ankenbrandt, Barbara Freedman Wand noted that  
federal courts in one circuit accept jurisdiction in cases involving determinations of status, 
while courts in another circuit do not. A nonmodifiable property settlement agreement may be 
enforced in some federal courts, but not in others. A suit between ex-spouses based on tort 
theories is considered a domestic relations case in one federal court, while another considers 
the case as cognizable in federal court as any other tort action involving diverse parties. 
Wand, supra note 59, at 335. As Wand has also stated:  
The lack of agreement among lower federal courts as to the appropriate scope of the domestic 
relations exception represents more than differing approaches to achieving a consistent series 
of results. The disagreement is more basic. It reflects the inability of federal courts to define 
the basic contours of the exception. The result of this basic disagreement is an exception to 
federal jurisdiction without workable boundaries. 
Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Anastasi v. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. 866 (D.N.J. 1982) (palimony action is within 
domestic relations exception); Walker v. Walker, 509 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Va. 1981) (claim for post-
due alimony dismissed as within exception); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) 
(dismissing claim for breach of a separation agreement regarding child visitation); Albanese v. Richter, 
67 F. Supp. 771, 772–74 (D. N.J. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1947) (dismissing claim brought 
by child born out of wedlock challenging validity of a contractual agreement concerning paternal 
responsibilities to her because court had no parens patriae authority over children); see also Rush, 
supra note 35, at 7 & n.32 (collecting cases). 
 62. See, e.g., Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059, 1060, 1062–63 (5th Cir. 1985) (dismissing tort 
claim against former husband and his relatives for unlawfully withholding child from custodial parent, 
as well as claim for modification of state custody decree, because entire case, including alleged torts, 
was “so immeshed in [the domestic relations] controversy as to be within the bounds of the domestic 
relations exception”); Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981) (dismissing ex-spouse’s 
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also refused to entertain claims seeking declaration of marital or parental 
status.63 Yet other courts, some within the same circuits, did not dismiss 
cases in similar situations, where the claims were based in contract64 or 
tort.65 In addition, some of these courts also heard claims relating to the 
declaration of marital or paternity status.66 
Despite the fact that the domestic relations exception had arisen in a 
diversity case,67 and that its rationales were based on the history of the 
federal diversity statute, the Supreme Court’s inconsistency in this area led 
some lower courts to apply the exception to federal question cases. Before 
Ankenbrandt, the lower federal courts were divided on whether or not the 
exception could apply in cases based on federal question jurisdiction.68  
 
 
counterclaim alleging alienation of child’s affection and infliction of mental anguish as within 
domestic relations exception); Nouse v. Nouse, 450 F. Supp. 97 (D.Md. 1978) (claim that ex-spouse 
interfered with his communication with their children dismissed as within exception); see also Rush, 
supra note 35, at 7 & n.32 (collecting cases). 
 63. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissing dispute over 
husband’s estate between spouse and putative spouse under domestic relations exception because it 
required a determination of the marital status of the parties); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 
1968) (dismissing claim to establish paternity for lack of jurisdiction); Bates v. Bushey, 407 F. Supp. 
163 (D.Me. 1976) (dismissing paternity action based on domestic relations exception); see also Rush, 
supra note 35, at 8 & n.33 (collecting cases). 
 64. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978) (enforcing separation agreement 
between ex-spouses); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719 (E.D.Pa. 1975) (enforcing 
contract for maintenance); see also Rush, supra note 35, at 7 & n.30 (collecting cases). 
 65. See, e.g., Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing district court 
dismissal under domestic relations exception where plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and interference with employment due to ex-spouse’s concealment of their children). In 
Drewes, the court of appeals noted that the tort damages action was not a pretense for a determination 
of custody. Id. at 471. The court also found that the ex-wife’s counterclaim for past-due child support, 
alimony, and medical expenses was not within the domestic relations exception. Id. at 472; see also 
Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (domestic relations exception did not apply 
to suit for tortious interference with child custody against ex-spouse and parents); Bennett v. Bennett, 
682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (no domestic relation exception to claim for monetary relief to father, 
legal custodian of children, when children were allegedly abducted by mother); Wasserman v. 
Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833–34 (4th Cir. 1982) (domestic relations exception did not apply to tort 
suit for child enticement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy arising from 
mother’s claim that her husband and others took children from her custody while divorce action was 
pending); see Rush, supra note 35, at 7 & n.31 (collecting cases). 
 66. See, e.g., Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (federal court may determine 
who is “wife” in Social Security benefits case); Estate of Borax v. Comm’r, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 
1965) (determining validity of Mexican divorce for purposes of federal income tax claim); Oxley v. 
Sweetland, 94 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1938) (where purpose of suit was to determine property rights, federal 
court may determine plaintiff’s marital status); see also Rush, supra note 35, at 8 & n.33 (collecting 
cases). 
 67. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). 
 68. Compare Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517, 520–21 (8th Cir. 1980) (dismissing claim 
by child that her removal from the United States due to a custody dispute violated her constitutional 
rights because consideration would cause the federal court to become involved in custody issues), Zak 
v. Pilla, 698 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (civil rights suit involving adoption agency falls 
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Further, when they found that the domestic relations exception did not 
apply, some federal courts nevertheless utilized abstention doctrines to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction. For example, Armstrong v. Armstrong69 
concerned a financial agreement regarding alimony and child support that 
had been made between spouses just prior to divorce.70 Under the 
agreement, payments by the husband were secured by a mortgage on 
several properties formerly owned jointly by the couple, but which were 
transferred to the husband.71 When he failed to make the required 
payments, his ex-wife brought foreclosure proceedings on the properties in 
state court. The ex-husband then brought a suit in state court to enjoin the 
foreclosure and reform the agreement.72 When the ex-wife sought to 
remove the case to federal court, the district court dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because “a federal court . . . has no jurisdiction whatever to 
modify state court decrees in domestic relations matters.”73 The First 
Circuit noted that the case technically might not fall within the domestic 
relations exception to jurisdiction; without deciding that issue, however, 
the court held that abstention was appropriate because an evaluation of the 
right to reform the agreement would be difficult to separate from the issue 
of the ex-husband’s support obligations, which must be decided in state 
court.74 Therefore, abstention would permit resolution of all the issues in 
one forum.75 However, several other federal courts rejected this reasoning 
and refused to use abstention in domestic relations cases based on 
diversity jurisdiction.76 
 
 
within domestic relations exception), and Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317–18 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(dismissing constitutional full faith and credit claim arising out of custody dispute because federal 
court “could become enmeshed in factual disputes”), with Fernos-Lopez v. Figarella Lopez, 929 F.2d 
20, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1991) (exception did not apply to constitutional procedural due process claim by 
ex-husband regarding alimony proceedings because the case was based on federal question jurisdiction 
and consideration of the constitutional claim would not require determination of the alimony issues). 
 69. 508 F.2d 348 (1st Cir. 1974).  
 70. Id. at 349. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting lower court decision). 
 74. Id. at 350. 
 75. Id.; see also Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1213–17 (6th Cir. 1981) (The 
court found abstention proper in claim by ex-wife and son against both former husband and trust 
company for failing to pay financial obligations out of trust proceeds; though the claims were framed 
as issues involving rights in various trusts, they really centered on the alleged unfulfilled support 
obligations, and thus were “integrally tied to the domestic relations issue” and could interfere with 
related state proceedings.). 
 76. Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (in action to enforce divorce 
decree that involves interpretation of federal bankruptcy laws, abstention improper); Korby v. 
Erickson, 550 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (abstention improper in claim relating to breach of 
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This confusion in the lower federal courts echoed the conflicting 
messages sent by the Supreme Court. In Zablocki v. Redhail,77 the Court 
considered abstention by federal courts in cases involving family issues.78 
Zablocki was a class action suit brought by Wisconsin residents who had 
been refused a marriage license under a state law that barred non-custodial 
parents from marrying unless they were in compliance with their support 
obligations and could demonstrate that the children covered by the support 
order were not then, and not likely thereafter, to become public charges.79 
Plaintiffs argued that the statute violated both the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.80  
The Court found that the lower court had correctly refused to abstain.81 
Younger was inapplicable because there was no pending state court 
proceeding in which the plaintiffs could have challenged the statute.82 The 
Court also stated that there were no ambiguities in the statute that required 
state court interpretation, no issues of state law that might affect the 
federal constitutional claims, and no requirement that plaintiffs bringing a 
§ 1983 action must bring their federal constitutional claims in state court 
before filing in a federal forum.83  
The State also argued that Burford abstention applied, and that the 
federal courts should have deferred to the state in carrying out its domestic 
policy.84 The Court distinguished Burford, however, noting that the 
present case “does not involve complex issues of state law, resolution of 
which would be ‘disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.’”85 Unlike some 
general pronouncements of the lower federal courts, here the Supreme 
Court stated that state regulation and policies relating to domestic relations 
would not necessarily trump the right of litigants to be heard in federal 
court, particularly where a federal question was involved.86 
 
 
contract between unmarried couple to share ownership of home); see also Rush, supra note 35, at 9 
n.36. 
 77. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Zablocki is best known for the Court’s explicit declaration of a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right to marry. 
 78. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 379, 384. 
 79. Id. at 376. 
 80. Id. at 376–77. 
 81. Id. at 379 n.5. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814–15 
(1976)). 
 86. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 379 n.5. 
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Yet the following year, the Court did find abstention appropriate in a 
federal question case that related to family matters. Though the Court had 
previously stated that the involvement of a federal question in the 
plaintiff’s claims would provide a strong argument against abstention,87 
the Court approved the use of Younger abstention in Moore v. Simms,88 
where parents challenged the constitutionality of a Texas statutory scheme 
that related to removal and custody of children by the state.89 The case can 
be distinguished from the situation in Zablocki because in Moore there 
were pending state proceedings involving the custody of the plaintiffs’ 
children, and because the federal constitutional claims could have been 
raised in that proceeding.90 However, the case demonstrated that the Court 
was not attempting to limit the use of abstention in federal question cases 
when domestic relations issues were involved. 
The lower federal courts have not hesitated to deny jurisdiction in 
federal question cases with some domestic relations involvement on 
grounds of abstention.91 In one case, the Sixth Circuit explained how 
abstention may be more appropriate than invocation of the domestic 
relations exception: “[W]hile older cases indicate that federal courts are 
entirely without jurisdiction to grant divorces or award custody of 
children, more recent decisions hold that strong policies of federal-state 
comity and deference to state expertise in the area are the theoretical 
underpinnings of federal courts’ refusal to consider such cases.”92 
Moreover, though there were federal questions presented, the federal 
courts can still abstain where those questions are “closely intertwined with 
issues of strong local interest.”93 
 
 
 87. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21 (1976). 
 88. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 
 89. Id. at 418–19. 
 90. Id. at 430–31. 
 91. See, e.g., Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 465–66 (9th Cir. 1983) (Though finding that a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought by a father alleging that a state agency violated his constitutional rights 
by denying him visitation is not within the domestic relations exception, the court abstained because of 
a pending state visitation proceeding and the fact that child custody is traditionally a state court 
matter.); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (abstention proper in case which, though framed 
as a state civil rights claim, was actually a demand for custody of child); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 
F.2d 625, 627–29 (6th Cir. 1978) (abstention proper in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and habeas corpus action 
involving the custody of four children who had participated in “Operation Babylift,” an airlift of 
several thousand South Vietnamese children to the United States just before the fall of the Saigon 
government in 1975); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1972) (abstention proper in 
federal civil rights claim by children alleging deprivation of their right to counsel in parents’ custody 
case). 
 92. Huynh Thi Anh, 586 F.2d at 632. 
 93. Id. at 633. 
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2. Domestic Relations Cases in the Lower Federal Courts After 
Ankenbrandt  
The frustration in the lower federal courts over the Supreme Court’s 
lack of clarity concerning the domestic relations exception continued after 
Ankenbrandt.94 The lower federal courts continued to diverge widely on 
the scope and application of the domestic relations exception. Those courts 
tending to interpret the exception broadly referred to Ankenbrandt’s 
“reaffirmance” of the exception,95 and continued to dismiss suits in 
contract96 or tort.97 Conversely, the federal courts inclined to interpret the 
exception narrowly characterized Ankenbrandt as substantially limiting its 
scope and held that various contract claims arising out of a domestic 
relations dispute did not fall within the exception.98 These cases often 
 
 
 94. As the Sixth Circuit stated: 
[I]n truth, the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is not the most coherent of 
doctrines. Such might be expected from the incongruous bases on which it stands: 
unsupported dictum in the majority opinion, and losing arguments in the dissent, in the case 
of Barber v. Barber. In its sporadic revisitations of the doctrine, the Supreme Court endowed 
it with varying degrees of force, and justified it with an assortment of rationales, some 
constitutional, some prudential, and some statutory. Not surprisingly, the lower courts have 
disagreed on the precise nature of the doctrine.  
Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 290–91 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1999); Mitchell-Angel v. 
Cronin, No. 95-7937, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1996); Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 
261 (7th Cir. 1995); Sw. Boston Senior Servs. v. Whatley, 396 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(While acknowledging that Ankenbrandt narrowed the exception, it “affirmed its existence,” so that a 
lawsuit to authorize protective services for an elderly man due to suspected elder abuse may be subject 
to the exception.). 
 96. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 193 F.3d at 411, 413 (dismissing claim for breach of a real estate sales 
agreement that had been incorporated into divorce degree, because, among other reasons, it attempted 
“to disguise the true nature of the action,” which was really a conflict over a divorce order); Cassens v. 
Cassens, 430 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836–37 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (claims involving a separation agreement for 
breach of contract, fraud, and a dispute over whether certain property was subject to the agreement 
dismissed under exception because claims “are in the nature of” a request for a decree regarding 
marital property and alimony).  
 97. For example, in McCracken v. Phillips, No. 96-1164, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 61, at *2 (10th 
Cir. Jan. 2, 1997), the plaintiff ex-wife brought an action against her former husband and his employer 
for failure to disclose complete financial information in their divorce action. She alleged that she was 
entitled to a portion of the actual value of the marital home and her husband’s pension benefits. Id. The 
Tenth Circuit dismissed the action because the claims “relate to the reopening of a divorce decree and 
settlement.” Id. at *6. 
 98. See, e.g., Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627, 630–31 (8th Cir. 1992) (claims for fraud and 
conversion by daughter relating to property settlement agreement incorporated into her parents’ 
divorce decree “concern[ed] a third-party beneficiary claim based on contract law,” a collateral issue 
to which the exception did not apply). 
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involved situations extremely similar to those where courts had dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction under the exception.99 
Though the Ankenbrandt Court located the rationale for the domestic 
relations exception in the diversity statute, lower federal courts continued 
to employ the exception in federal question cases.100 Some courts did not 
make clear whether they were relying on the exception or employing 
abstention principles. For example, after noting that the domestic relations 
 
 
 99. Writing for the court in Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998), Judge 
Posner held that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress involving a threat to reveal to a 
daughter her father’s real identity did not fall within the exception. Judge Posner suggested that the 
Supreme Court still had not fully explained the scope of the exception in Ankenbrandt. He argued that 
the domestic relations exception “has a core and a penumbra.” Id. at 740. While the Court had 
discussed the core of the exception, which involves a direct decree of divorce, child custody, or 
support, it had not ruled on the scope of ancillary proceedings that make up the exception’s penumbra. 
This was not necessary, because the claim at issue in Ankenbrandt was well outside any “plausible 
conception” of its bounds. Id. Judge Posner held that, similarly, the domestic relations exception 
clearly did not apply to the present tort claim merely because it arose out of a domestic relations 
dispute. Id. at 740–41; cf. Berntson v. Ind. Div. of Family & Children, No. 98-1024, 1998 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 20532, at *2–*4 (7th Cir. Apr. 10, 1998) (dismissing counts in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action that, 
unlike the tort claim in Friedlander, allege wrongful interference with plaintiff’s custody and visitation 
rights, and which involve review of those rights). The Berntson Court also held that the district court 
had properly dismissed plaintiff’s allegations challenging state court orders regarding custody and 
visitation because these, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, improperly attempted to challenge the 
state court actions through a federal claim. Id. at *4–*5. This doctrine, derived from Rooker v. Fid. 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), dictates that a 
federal court should not directly review state court decisions. The Court recently limited the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine in Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), to cases 
“brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before 
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.” Id. at 284; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam) (holding that lower 
court had erroneously dismissed case under Rooker-Feldman, by conflating preclusion principles with 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 
 100. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 260–61 (7th Cir. 1995) (dismissing under the 
exception a constitutional challenge by father to visitation proceedings because plaintiff challenged 
underlying visitation award and sought a declaration vacating the state visitation order). The Allen 
court recognized that the exception was “statutorily carved out from diversity jurisdiction,” but “its 
goal of leaving family disputes to the courts best suited to deal with them is equally strong, if not 
stronger” in this non-diversity case involving a fight over a child. Id. at 262 n.3; see also Mitchell-
Angel v. Cronin, No. 95-7937, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1996) (dismissing federal 
civil rights action brought by a mother against city officials, alleging a violation of her constitutional 
rights in the removal of her children from her custody). In Mitchell-Angel, the Second Circuit 
construed Ankenbrandt as holding that the domestic relations exception “applies generally to issues 
relating to the custody of minors.” Id. at *4–*5. The court did note that, unlike Ankenbrandt, this was a 
federal question case; however, citing pre-Ankenbrandt cases, the court simply stated that the 
exception had been applied to federal question jurisdiction, including civil rights actions. Id. In Mandel 
v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2003), the court raised the issue of whether Ankenbrandt’s 
domestic relations exception should apply to federal question claims. Id. at 271 (“[T]he courts are 
divided as to whether the doctrine is limited to diversity claims and this court has never decided that 
issue.”). Noting that “federal law increasingly affects domestic relations,” which made the issue of 
“potential importance,” the court nevertheless did not decide the question, but instead relied on 
abstention principles to dismiss the case. Id. 
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exception could apply to the case, the Second Circuit in Mitchell-Angel v. 
Cronin stated that some of the claims in the case at bar “either fall within 
the domestic relations exception or verge on being matrimonial in 
nature.”101 The court straddled a rationale for dismissal based on the 
domestic relations exception and one relying on abstention principles, 
without making clear the actual grounds for its ruling. While Ankenbrandt 
did not impact the Mitchell-Angel result, it may have led the Second 
Circuit to insert the abstention discussion due to continued uncertainty 
over the scope of the exception.102 
In other post-Ankenbrandt cases, the lower federal courts interpreted 
the domestic relations exception narrowly, though the fact that federal 
question jurisdiction was involved did not necessarily weigh in the 
decision.103 Further, some courts explicitly recognized that when the basis 
of federal jurisdiction was a federal question, rather than diversity, there 
was no rationale for utilizing the exception.104  
While some of the lower federal courts may have restrained their use of 
the domestic relations exception after Ankenbrandt, language from both 
the majority opinion and Justice Blackmun’s concurrence opened the door 
to broad use of the various abstention doctrines to avoid adjudicating cases 
 
 
 101. Mitchell-Angel, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416, at *5. 
 102. This straddling of the domestic relations exception and abstention was also apparent in a 
Sixth Circuit case, United States v. MacPhail. United States v. MacPhail, 149 F. App’x 449, 455–56 
(6th Cir. 2005) (referring to the exception, court dismissed tax liability case because proper allocation 
of refund between ex-spouses involved determination of marital property, and the state courts are “the 
more appropriate forum” for deciding the dispute); see also Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x 615 
(6th Cir. 2003) (dismissing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for denial of due process in state domestic 
relations litigation both on Rooker-Feldman grounds, and because it “lacked” jurisdiction where the 
constitutional claims were a mere “pretense” to cover what was really a domestic relations suit).  
 103. In Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2006), Judge Posner continued his narrow 
view of the exception. In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging that several individuals had conspired to 
defraud the plaintiff by corrupting her divorce proceedings, the court found that the exception was not 
applicable: “A federal court cannot grant or annul a divorce, but that is not what [the plaintiff] is 
seeking.” Id. at 440, 442; see also Palmer v. Riverside County, 149 F. App’x 643, 644–45 (9th Cir. 
2005) (reversing district court’s dismissal under the domestic relations exception and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought by parents alleging that officials violated their 
constitutional rights during child dependency proceedings). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 620 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
defendant’s constitutional challenge to the Child Support Recovery Act on several grounds and stating 
that defendant’s attempt to invoke the domestic relations exception was not relevant because the 
exception applied only in diversity cases); see also Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 291 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting district court’s use of the domestic relations exception to dismiss a federal due process 
challenge to state divorce proceedings because the case would not address the merits of the 
proceedings). The Catz court stated that plaintiff “asks the court to examine whether certain judicial 
proceedings, which happened to involve a divorce, comported with the federal constitutional guarantee 
of due process. This is a sphere in which the federal courts may claim an expertise at least equal to that 
of the state courts.” Id. at 291–92. 
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with some connection to domestic relations. Whether or not the Court and 
Justice Blackmun intended use of abstention in only a specified group of 
domestic relations cases, the lower federal courts have interpreted 
Ankenbrandt’s words far more generously.105  
In Dunn v. Cometa,106 for example, a father brought various tort and 
contract claims against his disabled adult son’s ex-wife, relating to her 
conduct after his son’s incapacity, in federal court.107 The First Circuit 
rejected the trial court’s use of the domestic relations exception to dismiss 
the case, citing Ankenbrandt’s holding that the exception be limited.108 
However, the First Circuit concluded that the claims met the conditions of 
Burford abstention discussed in Ankenbrandt.109 The counts at issue in 
Dunn presented such difficult state law issues because they involved the 
spousal relationship and “[c]onstructing a proper legal framework for 
resolving such charges amounts to regulating the marriage itself, a 
traditional state enterprise.”110 Despite the fact that the claims did not 
require any resolution of family status under state law, and that the relief 
sought would not interfere with any state court procedures in divorce, 
alimony, or custody, the First Circuit found that Burford abstention was 
appropriate, as “it is enough that abstention in this case fits squarely within 
the above quoted language from Ankenbrandt.”111  
 
 
 105. Writing shortly after Ankenbrandt, Naomi Cahn expressed concern that use of abstention 
may “simply perpetuate the Domestic Relations Exception under another name.” Cahn, supra note 35, 
at 1126. As the following discussion illustrates, this concern was quite accurate. Even before 
Ankenbrandt, commentators noted that the use of abstention principles by the courts may demonstrate 
the observed weakness of the various rationales for the domestic relations exception. See, e.g., 
Atwood, supra note 32, at 602–03. 
 106. 238 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 107. Dunn, 238 F.3d at 40. 
 108. Id. at 41. The court noted that just because some of the claims were based on the same 
underlying events that were at issue in the divorce and alimony actions, this did not mean that the 
claims were subject to the exception. Id. 
 109. Id. at 42 (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705–06 (1992) (citation omitted)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. The court also cited several policy reasons for its decision, including minimizing federal-
state court tensions, and the fact that the legal framework for these claims was not fully developed 
under state law. Id. at 42–43; see also Minot v. Eckhard-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 592 (2nd Cir. 1994) 
(finding it proper to remand back to state court, on abstention grounds, a removed tort action that was 
based on the actions of ex-wife in a custody dispute). The Second Circuit in Minot noted that it was 
“somewhat troubled” by the use of abstention to remand a case that had been properly removed to 
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 591, 593. It noted that “the family-law nature of the 
subject matter would not alone justify abstention in this case,” however, the tort claim of custodial 
interference was not well defined under New York law. Therefore, the case met the Burford standard 
for a difficult issue of state law that is of great public import. Id. at 593–94. Moreover, the tort claim 
involved issues still pending in the state custody action. Id. at 594. 
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However, not all of the lower federal courts have opted for abstention 
in matters that involve domestic relations post-Ankenbrandt.112 The lower 
courts have similarly divided on whether abstention is appropriate when a 
federal question is involved. Despite both the Ankenbrandt majority’s and 
Justice Blackmun’s focus on diversity cases for possible abstention, 
several lower courts have proceeded to use abstention principles in federal 
question cases,113 whereas other courts were not willing to apply 
abstention principles in domestic relations cases in these situations.114 
The murkiness of the lower federal courts’ case law in this area both 
before and after Ankenbrandt demonstrates that the rationales and scope 
identified for the domestic relations exception have never been clear or 
convincing. In Part II, I trace the history of the domestic relations 
exception in an effort to determine how the early case law justified its 
 
 
 112. For example, in Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1439–40 (11th Cir. 1998), a father sued 
relatives of his ex-wife and their lawyer in diversity for intentional interference with his custody of his 
daughter. The father argued that his lawsuit was in tort and did not fall within the domestic relations 
exception. Moreover, Ankenbrandt’s statement that abstention may be appropriate did not apply to his 
case, since it did not require a determination of status, nor of custody law. Id. at 1440–41. The district 
court had acknowledged that the claim did not clearly fall within the domestic relations exception, but 
held that abstention was appropriate. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the court should not 
have abstained because this action did not involve the status of a parent-child relationship or a parental 
dispute over the child, but instead was a tort action for damages against third parties who had no legal 
claim of custody. Id. at 1441. The court then certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court 
regarding the existence of this tort under Florida law. Id. at 1442–43; see also McCormick v. 
Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 389, 392–93 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing lower court’s use of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to dismiss a dispute over the receivership of property that was originally part of a 
reconciliation agreement between spouses; reflecting Exxon-Mobil’s limitation on Rooker-Feldman, 
the Court of Appeals held that these were independent claims that are subject to preclusion principles, 
but not barred under Rooker-Feldman).  
 113. See, e.g., Cormier v. Green, 141 F. App’x 808, 810–12 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding Younger 
abstention appropriate where plaintiff brought constitutional challenge to state alimony provisions 
when state divorce proceeding already pending; state had strong interest in alimony provisions, and 
plaintiff could raise his constitutional claims in the state action); Mandel v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 
267, 271–73 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding civil rights claim removed to federal court properly dismissed 
under both Rooker-Feldman and Younger because a federal district court injunction prohibiting 
removal of children conflicted with state custody decree and interfered with pending state 
proceedings); Amerson v. Iowa, 94 F.3d 510, 512 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court’s use of 
Burford, Colorado River, and Younger abstention to dismiss a mother’s § 1983 claim against various 
state entities for interference with her parental rights, because federal court review would disrupt 
state’s efforts to develop a “coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern” and 
would interfere with several pending state proceedings) (citation omitted). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1032, 1033–34 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(holding that abstention is not appropriate when, as here, a federal criminal charge was in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal courts). The court also rejected the defendant’s argument for Burford 
abstention in the federal criminal case charging violation of the Child Support Recovery Act, because 
even if the child support order was modified in a pending state proceeding, the amount owed would 
still meet that required under federal law. Id. at 1033. 
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creation, and whether any rationale exists that can help to define its current 
boundaries. 
II. HISTORY OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION 
A. Can a Wife “Be Regarded as a Citizen or Person?” Barber v. Barber115 
The domestic relations exception made its inauspicious debut in dicta 
from the majority opinion in Barber v. Barber, which cited no precedent 
or other authority.116 In Barber, a wife sought federal court enforcement of 
an alimony decree imposed by a state court against her husband, as part of 
a divorce a mensa et thoro.117 The Court began by discussing what it 
would not be deciding in the case: “We shall not have occasion to 
comment upon the relations of husband and wife in her uninterrupted 
coverture, nor will we discuss the general rights, obligations, or 
disabilities, of either, when they have been separated by a divorce a mensa 
et thoro.”118 In addition, the Court stressed that this was not a suit to 
determine alimony, which a state court of competent jurisdiction had 
already done.119 It is in this context that the famous dicta appear without 
explanation: 
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United 
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, 
 
 
 115. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 600 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“In the exercise of this 
jurisdiction, we are forced to inquire, from the facts disclosed in the cause . . . . [w]hether, indeed, by 
any regular legal deduction consistent with [the marriage] relation, the wife can, as to her civil or 
political status, be regarded as a citizen or person?”). 
 116. Several commentators have noted that the Barber dicta did not cite to any legal basis for the 
exception. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 58, at 669; Wand, supra note 59, at 312; Poker, supra note 35, at 
142, 144. Wand also points out that of the four cases commonly cited for the foundation of the 
domestic relations exception—Barber, Burrus, Simms, and De La Rama—none involved denial of 
jurisdiction in a domestic relations case based on diversity. Wand, supra note 59, at 319–20. 
 117. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 583. An action for divorce a mensa et thoro (“from bed and 
board”) is equivalent to a legal separation in modern terms. Such a divorce entitled the award of 
alimony, but did not end the marriage, and the parties were not permitted to remarry. This limited type 
of divorce is distinguished from a divorce a vinculo matrimonii (“from the marriage ties”), which is an 
absolute divorce that severed the relationship and permitted remarriage. The two types of decrees were 
completely separate actions and originally were determined by separate bodies—a divorce a mensa et 
thoro was under the authority of the ecclesiastical courts and was the only type of divorce they would 
grant, while a divorce a vinculo matrimonii could only be obtained by act of Parliament. See Spindel v. 
Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).  
 118. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584. 
 119. Id.  
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either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to 
divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.120 
The lower federal courts, scholars, and the Supreme Court itself have 
struggled to understand the rationale for these words, which became the 
basis for what is now known as the domestic relations exception. 
Huldah Barber had brought a divorce action through her next friend in 
New York state court.121 Her husband, Hiram Barber, opposed the action, 
but the court granted the application.122 Though the opinion provides little 
detail, it appears that Hiram committed some type of physical or 
psychological abuse against Huldah: “the defendant had been guilty of 
cruel and inhuman treatment of his wife, and of such conduct towards her 
as to render it unsafe and improper for her to cohabit with him; and that he 
had abandoned, neglected, and refused to provide for her.”123 The court 
ordered Hiram to pay permanent alimony to Huldah, including alimony 
due retroactively since Hiram had failed to give her any support while the 
divorce action was pending.124  
Shortly after the divorce decree, Hiram, having no intention of paying 
the alimony, moved to Wisconsin in order to place himself beyond the 
jurisdiction of the New York court.125 He subsequently filed a suit for 
divorce a vinculo against his wife in Wisconsin state court, which he 
obtained, failing to inform that court of the prior New York decree.126 
Huldah filed her action to enforce the New York decree in federal district 
court in Wisconsin, alleging that her husband had failed to pay any part of 
the alimony due to her.127 The court ruled in her favor and issued a decree 
ordering Hiram to pay almost $6000 in past-due alimony.128  
The Supreme Court stated that it was called upon to consider two 
issues on appeal: first, whether a wife who is divorced a mensa et thoro 
can acquire a domicile in a state separate from her husband in order to 
entitle her to meet the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction; and 
 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 585. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 585–86. 
 125. Id. at 584, 588. 
 126. Id. at 587, 588. The district court noted that Barber actually alleged that his wife had willfully 
abandoned him. Id. at 588. 
 127. Id. at 586. 
 128. Id. at 587. 
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second, whether a court sitting in equity is a proper tribunal for an action 
to enforce the state court’s alimony decree.129  
The Court began with the second question, the scope of a court of 
equity’s jurisdiction, and noted that such a court has a “large jurisdiction 
. . . to secure the rights of married women.”130 In England, a court of 
equity had always had jurisdiction to enforce the payment of alimony that 
had been awarded in the ecclesiastical court. The Court argued that such 
enforcement powers of an equity court are equally applicable to a validly 
issued decree from a state court in the United States.131 This enforcement 
can be undertaken either in the state or federal courts of equity, assuming 
the federal diversity requirements are met.132 
Having decided that the federal courts do have jurisdiction in equity to 
enforce alimony awards, the Court then considered the first question on 
appeal: whether a wife divorced a mensa et thoro from her husband could 
establish her own domicile, and thus have citizenship diverse from that of 
her husband.133 This was the central issue in the case, and would 
determine whether the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction had 
been met. 
The defendant argued that though there had been a legal separation 
through the divorce a mensa et thoro, the marriage relation continued, so 
that the domicile of the wife must continue to follow that of her 
husband.134 However, the Court found that when a husband has abandoned 
his wife and failed to live up to his requirement of supporting her, he gives 
up “that power and authority over her which alone makes his domicil 
hers.”135 In this situation, the wife may sue for a divorce a mensa et thoro, 
and for alimony. When this award has been made, it is a judicial debt of 
record that is owed full faith and credit by other jurisdictions. Such a debt 
can therefore be enforced in other jurisdictions as it would be in the 
issuing state.136  
“Whatever may have been the doubts in an earlier day,” the Court 
stated, the law is now that a wife legally separated from her husband may 
 
 
 129. Id. at 584. 
 130. Id. at 590. 
 131. Id. at 590–91. 
 132. Id. at 592. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 592–93. 
 135. Id. at 595. 
 136. Id. 
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establish a separate domicile.137 This rests on fundamental fairness, 
because a legally separated wife is without secure resources:  
the alimony commonly allowed is no more than enough to give her 
a home and a scanty maintenance, almost always necessarily short 
of that from which her husband has driven her; and that as a 
consequence she should be permitted to change her domicil, where 
she may live upon her narrow allowance with most comfort and the 
least mortification.138  
A legally separated wife also should be allowed to sue independently of 
her husband, because the divorce a mensa et thoro has given her both 
rights and responsibilities. She may make contracts and may acquire and 
keep her own property and earnings, but she also may have custody of her 
children and be responsible for their support, as well as her own:139 “If she 
could not sue and be sued, it would present the anomalous case in which 
the law recognises a right without affording a remedy for vindicating it, 
and subjects a party to a duty without lending its aid to enforce it.”140 
The Court concluded that Huldah had a right to sue her husband, from 
whom she was divorced a mensa et thoro, in a court of equity for 
enforcement of the New York alimony award. She had also established the 
requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction. She could have brought her 
suit in either the state court of equity or in the federal district court, “but 
she had a right to pursue her remedy in either. She has chosen to do so in a 
court of the United States, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
her claim to the same extent that a court of equity of a State has.”141 As is 
apparent from the quoted language, the majority opinion is quite 
progressive on the issues before the Court. On the central question, it 
holds that a legally separated woman may establish a domicile on her own, 
thus permitting her to meet the requirements for federal diversity 
jurisdiction.142 
The dissent’s primary disagreement with the majority concerned the 
legal domicile of a wife when divorced a mensa et thoro from her 
husband. In dissent, Justice Daniel argued that this type of divorce “does 
 
 
 137. Id. at 597. 
 138. Id. at 598. 
 139. Id. at 598–99. 
 140. Id. at 599. 
 141. Id.  
 142. See Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal 
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1741–42 (1991) [hereinafter “Naturally” Without Gender] (noting 
how Barber’s actual holding was recast and distorted in later cases). 
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not sever the matrimonial tie; on the contrary, it recognises and sustains 
that tie, and the allowance of alimony arises from and depends upon 
reciprocal duties and obligations involved in that connection.”143 
Therefore, the wife may not establish a domicile separate from that of her 
husband, and by definition, cannot meet the federal diversity 
requirement.144 Justice Daniel noted that the purpose of the legal 
separation is so the wife “should be freed from the control which had been 
abused, and should be empowered to select a residence and such 
associations as would be promotive of her safety and comfort.”145 
However, “such a privilege does not destroy the marriage relation; much 
less does it remit the parties to the position in which they stood before 
marriage, and create or revive ante-nuptial, civil, or political rights in the 
wife.”146  
Moreover, according to the dissent, the federal courts are not the proper 
location for alimony enforcement actions. First, the wife’s right to alimony 
is conditional and dependent upon her “personal merits and conduct,” so 
that it is not an “absolute debt” which she may enforce against her 
husband in any jurisdiction.147 Moreover, judging such private and 
intimate conduct is not the job of the federal courts.148 It is to the state 
courts, which are in the “particular communities of which those families 
form parts,” that this responsibility falls.149 Federal government has “its 
origin in causes and necessities, political, general, and external,”150 and 
federal courts should not “with a kind of inquisitorial authority, enter the 
habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of private families, 
and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and habits and affections 
or antipathies of the members of every household.”151 The standards to 
judge this private morality and behavior are diverse, and should be within 
the authority of the states and their courts.152 
At the end of the dissent, Justice Daniel expressed his disagreement 
with the majority’s view of the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in 
 
 
 143. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 601 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 603. She would not be entitled to alimony, for example, if she misbehaved or acted 
criminally. The effect of such misconduct, the dissent says, is retroactive, so that it would affect even 
alimony already owed and due, as well as future amounts. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 602–03. 
 150. Id. at 602. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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equity. Federal courts in equity derive the scope of their jurisdiction from 
their English counterparts, and “it is well known that the court of chancery 
in England does not take cognizance of the subject of alimony, but that 
this is one of the subjects of the ecclesiastical court, within whose peculiar 
jurisdiction marriage and divorce are comprised.”153 The dissent 
acknowledged the argument that there are no ecclesiastical courts in the 
United States, so that jurisdiction is by definition differently composed, 
and that many state courts have taken jurisdiction over divorce and 
alimony in their courts of equity.154 The state courts may derive their 
authority from express legislative grants or may simply have assumed this 
jurisdiction, noted Justice Daniel; but whatever the explanation, “their 
example and practice cannot be recognised as sources of authority by the 
courts of the United States.”155 
Therefore the dissent raised arguments both about the historical 
limitations of chancery court jurisdiction and about the need for local 
involvement in family matters in support of keeping domestic relations 
cases out of federal court. It is the historical argument that the 
Ankenbrandt majority utilized when searching for a rationale for the 
domestic relations exception. Notably, however, the Barber dissent never 
linked the historical limitation to the congressional statute establishing 
federal diversity jurisdiction, though Ankenbrandt attempted to make that 
connection. In fact, the Barber dissent did not make clear whether the 
limitation on federal court jurisdiction derived from the English chancery 
courts has been integrated into our Constitution, our statutes, or is simply 
found within our common law tradition.  
The Ankenbrandt Court argued that by failing to comment at all on the 
dissent’s rationale for the limitation on federal jurisdiction, the Barber 
majority was accepting the dissent’s historical explanation. However, this 
is problematic because we know that the Barber majority disagreed with at 
least part of the dissent’s historical justification. The majority took a 
broader view of equity court jurisdiction than the dissent. The majority, 
unlike the dissent, argued that these courts historically have always had 
the power to enforce alimony awards. Moreover, the majority found that 
 
 
 153. Id. at 604. Moreover, 
as the jurisdiction of the chancery in England does not extend to or embrace the subjects of 
divorce and alimony, and as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in chancery is 
bounded by that of the chancery in England, all power or cognizance with respect to those 
subjects by the courts of the United States in chancery is equally excluded. 
Id. at 605. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
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federal courts in equity have power equal to that of the state equity courts, 
while the dissent argued that the federal court jurisdiction is more 
limited.156 It is true that the majority never stated whether a federal court 
in equity could decide a divorce or alimony matter directly, and the 
majority’s famous dicta may imply that it could not, thus agreeing with the 
dissent in this regard. But the majority never said this. And the fact that 
the majority’s only statement on the historical rationale was to differ 
explicitly with the dissent undermines the argument that the majority 
based its dicta on the dissent’s explanation.  
Moreover, because the dissent itself did not identify where the 
historical limitation is actually located in our system, assuming the 
majority acquiesced to the dissent, it is still not clear whether Barber 
would stand for the proposition that the domestic relations exception is 
constitutionally required, required under the federal statute, or simply 
dictated by common law precedent. In Ankenbrandt, the Court explicitly 
found that the domestic relations exception was not constitutionally based, 
but rather had as its foundation the Judiciary Act. The Barber dissent, 
however, never discussed this jurisdictional statute. Therefore the 
historical argument, if gleaned from Barber, still offers little guidance on 
the exception’s rationale.  
If the historical rationale seems at best to provide only a partial 
explanation for the Barber Court’s declaration that the federal courts do 
not have jurisdiction to hear divorce or alimony actions, is there any other 
basis for its statement? One explanation may be found in the issue that 
most deeply divided the Court—the ability of a wife to establish federal 
diversity jurisdiction. As we have seen, the majority argued that when 
legally separated from her husband, a woman may establish her own 
domicile and acquire independent citizenship, while for the dissent, the 
marital bond and the merging of the wife into the husband’s legal identity 
continued.157  
However, neither the majority nor the dissent disputed the basic 
principles of coverture. When a husband and wife are married and there 
has not yet been legal recognition of a separation or divorce, both the 
majority and the dissent would agree that the wife’s domicile is that of her 
husband, and that she cannot establish diversity of citizenship.158 One 
 
 
 156. Id. at 592 (quoting Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1839)). 
 157. Id. at 595, 601. 
 158. Id. at 594 (discussing how a voluntary informal separation, as opposed to one recognized by 
the courts, would not destroy marital unity, and the wife’s domicile would follow that of her husband 
in that situation). 
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possible rationale for the Court’s dicta is that it is a statement regarding 
the inability of a wife to meet the requirements of federal diversity 
jurisdiction at the time she is bringing an action for divorce and/or 
alimony—i.e., when she is still married and cannot create a legally 
recognized domicile separate from her husband. The Court’s statement 
that there is no jurisdiction in the federal courts for divorce and alimony 
comes in the opinion’s initial section where the Court enunciated all of the 
questions that are not at issue in the present case. Immediately after this 
statement, the Court noted that the issues in the case included whether a 
wife who is divorced a mensa et thoro “can acquire another domiciliation 
in a State of this Union different from that of her husband, to entitle her, 
by her next friend, to sue him in a court of the United States having equity 
jurisdiction.”159 The feature distinguishing the dicta, which is not at issue, 
from the question being considered in the case is the marital status of the 
woman. The Court simply may have meant that there was no disagreement 
that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over a married woman in an 
action against her husband, because there would be no diversity, while the 
question of whether that reasoning applies to a woman divorced a mensa 
et thoro was debatable and at issue in the case.  
In this way, it may be that what has come to be known as the “domestic 
relations exception” was not really an exception to diversity jurisdiction at 
all. Rather, it described a situation in which the requirements of diversity 
jurisdiction could not be met because a married woman could not establish 
independent citizenship from her husband. Subsequent case law 
demonstrates that at least at some times, the Court acknowledged that this 
explanation provided a basis for the refusal of the federal courts to hear 
domestic relations cases.160 
B. Federal Habeas and Child Custody: In re Burrus 
In re Burrus161 is often cited as the Court’s next building block in 
establishing the domestic relations exception.162 However, closer 
examination reveals that the case did not concern or rule on the exception 
at all. The case involved a custody dispute over a child, Evelyn Estelle 
Miller, between her father, Louis Miller, and her maternal grandparents, 
Thomas and Catherine Burrus. When his wife was terminally ill, Miller 
 
 
 159. Id. at 584. 
 160. See infra text accompanying notes 191, 204–07.  
 161. 136 U.S. 586 (1890). 
 162. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1143; Stein, supra note 58, at 676. 
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had voluntarily given custody of Evelyn to the Burrus grandparents.163 
Subsequently, Miller remarried and wanted to regain custody of Evelyn. 
When the grandparents would not voluntarily return her, Miller applied 
for, and was granted, a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to recover 
custody of the child.164  
When the federal judge ordered the grandparents to produce Evelyn, 
they obeyed and returned her to Miller in court; however, when Miller was 
with Evelyn on a train traveling home, the grandparents boarded the train 
and forcibly stole the child.165 Thomas Burrus was charged with contempt 
for disobeying the court order and was imprisoned in a county jail.166 In 
the case before the Supreme Court, Burrus sought his own writ of habeas 
corpus, claiming that he had been unlawfully detained because the federal 
district court judge had had no jurisdiction to issue the custody order in the 
underlying case.167  
The issue presented to the Court was the limit of federal courts’ 
jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases when matters that were not questions of 
federal law were involved. The Court stated that the federal courts may 
exercise jurisdiction over a habeas corpus action in such a situation only 
when “by reason of some other matter or thing in the case, the court has 
jurisdiction which it can enforce by means of this writ.”168 The Court held 
that, because “we know of no statute, no provision of law, no authority 
intended to be conferred upon the District Court of the United States to 
take cognizance of a case of this kind,” the federal court did not have 
jurisdiction to issue the original writ of habeas corpus against Burrus to 
produce the child; therefore, both that writ and the order holding him in 
contempt for failure to comply were void.169  
At that time, only federal circuit courts and not the district courts had 
diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, in this case, the federal district court had 
proper jurisdiction only if the matter fell within the scope of federal 
jurisdiction in habeas cases.170 The Court explicitly reserved decision on 
the question of whether child custody cases where diverse citizenship of 
 
 
 163. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 587. 
 164. Id. at 587–88. 
 165. Id. at 588. 
 166. Id. at 588–89. 
 167. Id. at 589. 
 168. Id. at 597. 
 169. Id.  
 170. See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (interpreting Burrus as 
involving only the power of federal courts under the habeas corpus statutes to make a custody award in 
the absence of diversity jurisdiction); see also Atwood, supra note 32, at 579 & n.51. 
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the parties existed can be heard in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.171  
However, in dicta, the Court declared that “[t]he whole subject of the 
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the 
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States,”172 a statement 
that federal courts have relied on to add child custody to divorce and 
alimony as a subject that cannot be considered by federal courts.173 Yet a 
reading of that statement in context demonstrates that the Court was not 
discussing the allocation of jurisdiction between the state and federal 
courts, but rather state and federal laws and the difference between 
diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The sentences immediately 
after the statement quoted above read: 
As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is 
contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to 
which neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority of 
the United States has any special jurisdiction. Whether the one or 
the other is entitled to the possession does not depend upon any act 
of Congress, or any treaty of the United States or its Constitution.174  
The Court here is merely making the uncontroversial point that 
questions of custody are based on state laws, and thus can not be the basis 
for federal question jurisdiction; therefore, they can not be the basis for 
jurisdiction in a federal habeas case in district court.175  
C. Appeals from Federal Territories: Simms and De La Rama 
The Court next addressed the domestic relations exception in two cases 
appealed from federal territorial courts. The Court made clear in both 
decisions that it would treat the territorial courts differently from state 
courts. In Simms v. Simms,176 the Court considered a divorce and alimony 
 
 
 171. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 596–97. The Court stated that this issue “had never been decided by 
this court that we are aware of, [n]or is it necessary to decide it in this case,” which involved the 
federal court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, rather than its jurisdiction over child 
custody matters based on diversity of the parties. Id. at 596.  
 172. Id. at 593–94. 
 173. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1143. Judge Gibbons has noted that “Burrus stands for no such 
proposition, and the occasional reference to it by secondary authorities, and even cases, for that 
proposition, displays a propensity for reliance on headnotes.” Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 
1031 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).  
 174. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added). 
 175. Atwood, supra note 32, at 579. 
 176. 175 U.S. 162 (1899). 
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award on appeal from the territorial Supreme Court of Arizona. Citing 
Barber, the appellee argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction 
because the matter fell within the domestic relations exception.177 The 
Court agreed that this would have been the case had the matter originated 
in a state court, “[b]ut those considerations have no application to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of a Territory, or to the appellate jurisdiction of 
this court over those courts.”178 Because specific congressional statutes 
dictated the jurisdiction of the territorial courts and of the courts hearing 
appeals from their judgments, the domestic relations exception did not 
apply.179 The Court then reviewed the alimony award and counsel fees in 
the case.180  
However, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the actual 
divorce decree.181 This again was not because of a domestic relations 
exception, but due to the inability of the divorce to meet the amount in 
controversy required because “that was a matter the value of which could 
not be estimated in money. . . .”182  
Though it was not applicable in the case, the Simms Court repeated the 
dicta from Barber.183 It also cited the Burrus statement out of context, 
which began the statement’s use as support for the domestic relations 
exception.184 Though Simms is cited as a foundational case for the 
domestic relations exception, the actual case held that it did not apply and 
merely quoted from dicta in Barber and Burrus. Moreover, Simms offered 
another factor to consider: whether the subject of divorce could ever meet 
the amount in controversy requirements of the jurisdictional statutes. If 
not, then this subject, as well as custody, may be excluded from federal 
courts not due to any exception to jurisdiction, but simply because they do 
not satisfy the diversity jurisdiction requirements. 
A few years after Simms, the Court considered De La Rama v. De La 
Rama,185 a case on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine 
 
 
 177. Id. at 167. 
 178. Id. at 167–68. 
 179. Id. at 165–68. The statute providing appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review 
judgments of the supreme court of a Territory “include[d] those cases, and those cases only, at law or 
in equity, in which ‘the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand 
dollars.’” Id. at 167. 
 180. Id. at 169–72. 
 181. Id. at 168. 
 182. Id. at 168–69. The Court also stated that, because the divorce judgment involved only 
questions of fact, the Court was not authorized to reexamine it. Id. at 169. 
 183. Id. at 167. 
 184. The misconstruing of the Burrus language has continued through the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ankenbrandt. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702–03 (1992). 
 185. 201 U.S. 303 (1906). 
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Islands.186 The plaintiff wife had brought a suit against her husband for 
legal separation, alimony, and an award of marital property. The trial court 
granted the separation and awarded her over eighty thousand dollars for 
her share of marital property and alimony. The Supreme Court of the 
Philippines reversed, and the wife appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.187  
The Court began its opinion by citing the Barber dicta. However, the 
Court quickly noted that, as in Simms, this statement had no application to 
the case because it did not apply to the jurisdiction of the territorial courts 
or to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over those courts.188 
The Court was more concerned with the scope of its review, and whether 
or not it could re-examine facts relating to the judicial separation on which 
the property and alimony award depended. The Court determined that if 
the denial of alimony or property depended upon evidence relating to the 
right to the legal separation, the Court needed to review the sufficiency of 
the testimony regarding the separation; “an appeal from the decree for 
alimony or other property right would be of no value whatever, unless the 
facts connected with the allowance or refusal of such right were open to 
review in the appellate court.”189 The Court then examined in great detail 
the trial testimony and evidence concerning the grounds for separation, 
and ultimately found that the wife was entitled to the award of property 
and alimony pendente lite.190 
Of most interest in the case is the rationale that the Court provided for 
the federal courts’ general refusal to hear divorce and alimony cases. The 
Court made no reference to the historical rationale regarding the English 
chancery courts’ scope of jurisdiction or to the scope of the congressional 
statute on federal jurisdiction. Rather, it stated: 
It has been a long established rule that the courts of the United 
States have no jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce, or for the 
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery, 
or an incident of a divorce or separation both by reason of fact that 
the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different States, 
so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been 
 
 
 186. Id. at 309. 
 187. Id. at 310. 
 188. Id. at 308. 
 189. Id. at 310. 
 190. Id. at 312–19. 
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somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a 
suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value.191  
The Court then cited to Barber for this proposition. This language from 
De La Rama supports the theory that the Barber dicta were not 
establishing a historically based exception to federal jurisdiction for 
domestic relations; rather, it was merely stating that the requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction could not be met. This was due to the principle of 
coverture that prevented a married woman from establishing citizenship 
separately from her husband, a rule that the De La Rama Court noted was 
already becoming outmoded. Finally, the De La Rama Court adopted the 
argument from Simms that a divorce could not be assigned monetary value 
and so could not meet the amount in controversy requirement. 
D. Divorce and the Foreign Diplomat: Popovici 
The final case in which the Supreme Court addressed the domestic 
relations exception before Ankenbrandt involved a diplomat from 
Romania. In Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler,192 the Vice-Consul of 
Romania had married a resident of Ohio who later sued him for divorce 
and alimony in the Ohio state courts.193 The Vice-Consul objected, 
arguing that the state courts did not have jurisdiction since Article III of 
the Constitution stated that federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
over foreign diplomats.194  
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes found that despite the 
“sweeping” language of Article III regarding foreign diplomats, its 
language must be interpreted in light of the “three-quarters of a century” in 
which the federal courts had not heard divorce and alimony matters.195 
Justice Holmes invoked the historical rationale, as well as the 
understanding of the Framers of the Constitution: 
 
 
 191. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). 
 192. 280 U.S. 379 (1930). 
 193. Id. at 382. 
 194. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1, cl. 2 (“The Judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.” “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls . . . the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”); see also 
Judicial Code, § 256, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911); (“The jurisdiction vested in the courts 
of the United States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be exclusive of the 
courts of the several States, . . . Eighth. Of all suits and proceedings against ambassadors, or other 
public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants or against consuls or vice–consuls.”).  
 195. Popovici, 280 U.S. at 383. 
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If when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding 
was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and 
child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in 
construing the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing with 
the statutes. ‘Suits against consuls and vice-consuls’ must be taken 
to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not to include what 
formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts.196  
The meaning of this opinion for the domestic relations exception is 
somewhat unclear. The above-quoted language could indicate that the 
Court was holding that the federal courts, even where Article III appeared 
to give them exclusive jurisdiction, could not hear a domestic relations 
matter due to the historical limitations on this jurisdiction that were 
incorporated into the Constitution. There are some problems with that 
analysis, however.  
First, due to the procedural stance of the case, in which the diplomat 
was arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction to decide the divorce, 
the Supreme Court was not considering whether a federal court could have 
jurisdiction over such a case, but rather whether or not the state had the 
right to exercise jurisdiction. Language in the opinion supports this 
perspective. For example, Justice Holmes stated, “[t]he words quoted from 
the Constitution do not of themselves and without more exclude the 
jurisdiction of the State.”197 The opinion concludes: “In the absence of any 
prohibition in the Constitution or laws of the United States it is for the 
State to decide how far it will go.”198 This has led some judges and 
commentators to argue that the case actually held that the state court may 
take jurisdiction of divorce and alimony cases involving foreign 
diplomats, not that the federal court may not exercise such jurisdiction.199 
Moreover, to the extent that Popovici was arguing that the Constitution 
limits federal jurisdiction over domestic relations matters due to the 
historical understanding of jurisdiction derived from England, this has 
been overruled by the Court in Ankenbrandt, which stated explicitly that 
the domestic relations exception is not constitutionally based.200 
 
 
 196. Id. at 383–84. 
 197. Id. at 383. (emphasis added). 
 198. Id. at 384. 
 199. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he fact that the Ohio court had jurisdiction tells us nothing about the presence or absence of 
federal district court jurisdiction.”); Atwood, supra note 32, at 583 n.86. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
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E. Coverture and the Inability to Meet the Requirements of Federal 
Diversity Jurisdiction 
This review of the Court’s case law in this area demonstrates that there 
has been no holding that actually barred jurisdiction in the federal courts 
due to the domestic relations exception. Moreover, the historical rationale, 
relied upon in Ankenbrandt to support maintaining the exception, is open 
to serious question and had not consistently been the basis for the Court’s 
previous holdings in the area.201 As Judge Gibbons memorably described 
the situation, “there is no well-established domestic relations exception to 
our subject matter jurisdiction,” but rather only “a collection of 
misstatements of ancient holdings and of ill-considered dicta.”202  
It may be that the original justification for Barber’s declaration 
regarding divorce and alimony cases was not the existence of an exception 
to federal jurisdiction, but simply that federal jurisdiction could not be 
established due to the inability of a married woman to establish a domicile 
separate from that of her husband.203 In addition to Barber itself, the De 
La Rama Court expressly provided this explanation for the Barber 
statement.204 Some lower federal courts also construed Barber in this way. 
For example, in Bowman v. Bowman,205 a federal circuit court in Illinois 
stated: “It is a rule so well fixed as not to require the citation of authorities 
in its support that the citizenship of the wife follows the citizenship of the 
husband; and hence, for this reason, perhaps more than any other, this 
class of litigation has never obtained admission in the federal courts.”206 
After quoting the Barber dicta, the court noted that the “main ground” of 
the Barber dissenting opinion was that there could be no diversity 
jurisdiction because of the legal unity of husband and wife, so that “we 
 
 
 201. In fact, the historical explanation provided by Justice Daniel’s dissent in Barber was 
mentioned only briefly in Popovici, and had not been discussed in any other Supreme Court decisions 
involving the domestic relations exception. See Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1146. 
 202. Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
 203. The Ankenbrandt Court may have recognized that, even if the historical rationale for the 
exception was somewhat dubious, it was a better justification than the principles of coverture, which 
would have been both obviously outdated and embarrassingly derogatory to women.  
 204. See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 582 (1858)); see also Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1144 (“The Court’s decision in De La Rama 
is significant because it was the first decision to provide a rationale for the Court’s earlier dicta; 
however, the Court solely justified the domestic relations exception with the failure to meet statutory 
diversity requirements.”); supra text accompanying note 191.  
 205. 30 F. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887). 
 206. Bowman, 30 F. at 849. 
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have in that case the unanimous opinion of the court that this class of cases 
cannot be entertained here.”207  
The assertion that an action for divorce or determination of marital 
status could not be heard in federal court because marital status could not 
be reduced to a pecuniary value also was an argument about failure to 
meet diversity requirements and did not establish an exception to such 
jurisdiction. In both Simms and De La Rama, the Court noted that a 
divorce could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, and so 
there was no basis for diversity jurisdiction in such an action.208 In 
addition, several lower federal court cases adopted this rationale.209 
Of course, with the end of legal recognition for coverture, the “inability 
to establish a separate domicile” argument is no longer valid. Moreover, 
since a plaintiff may aggregate multiple claims against a single defendant, 
the amount in controversy requirement is often met in divorce cases when 
there is a dispute over child support, maintenance, or property 
distribution.210 Therefore, the justification for refusing to hear domestic 
relations cases based on failure to meet diversity jurisdiction requirements 
can no longer be valid. If this is correct, then the question is whether there 
are alternative rationales that justify barring federal jurisdiction in certain 
domestic relations cases. This question is explored in Part III. 
III. RATIONALES FOR THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION 
The Ankenbrandt Court noted that the “domestic relations exception” 
was not constitutionally required, as there was nothing in Article III, 
Section 2’s delineation of federal judicial power that suggested any 
limitation for domestic relations matters.211 The rationale that the federal 
 
 
 207. Id. at 850. Despite changes in the law permitting wives to have independent legal identities, 
some courts continued to utilize the unitary domicile of a married couple to rationalize lack of 
diversity jurisdiction until quite recently. See, e.g., Campbell v. Oliva, 295 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Tenn. 
1968); Seidman v. Hamilton, 173 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff’d, 275 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 208. Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168–69 (1899); De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 
307 (1906). 
 209. See, e.g., Rapoport v. Rapoport, 416 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1969); Walpert v. Walpert, 329 F. 
Supp. 25, 26 (D.N.J. 1971). 
 210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 211. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). Some 
lower federal courts had previously made this point. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 
349 (1st Cir. 1974) (“Article III judicial power is broad enough to cover even such matrimonial 
matters if Congress were to provide.”); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
Some commentators have also noted a possible Tenth Amendment argument in support of the 
domestic relations exception. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). However, the Tenth Amendment appears to place limits on the federal government’s ability 
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statute on diversity jurisdiction incorporates the limitations on English 
chancery jurisdiction is weak, based on questionable historical analysis 
and a strained interpretation of the statute in Ankenbrandt that turns 
congressional silence into intent.212 Further, the justification that the 
diversity requirements cannot be met in these cases has disappeared.213 If 
there is no constitutional or statutory exception to federal jurisdiction, and 
no failure to meet diversity requirements, there appears to be no remaining 
justification for continuing to bar domestic relations matters from federal 
courts. However, the exception has remained remarkably resilient.214 This 
Part reviews other rationales put forth by the courts to maintain the 
exception. 
A. The Argument from Tradition 
Some lower federal courts, left without a constitutional or statutory 
justification for the exception, have frankly acknowledged that it was 
judicially created in dicta in a series of decisions by the Supreme Court.215 
As such, the lower federal courts are not in a position to question the 
exception, particularly because it has existed for so long.216 Ankenbrandt 
also relies on this argument from tradition:  
 
 
to make substantive law, not on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Cahn, supra note 35, at 
1095–97; Poker, supra note 35, at 160–61. 
 212. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (“[O]ne might question 
the suggestion . . . that a century of congressional silence constitutes legislative adoption of what was 
originally, and maybe still is today, a purely judge-made exception to the diversity jurisdiction.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 209–10. 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 59–114. As one commentator noted, “[A]bsent an 
explicit repudiation of the exception by Congress or the Supreme Court, the lower courts appear to be 
unwilling to abolish the exception.” Poker, supra note 35, at 143. At one point, there was an effort to 
insert the domestic relations exception into statutory law. One draft of a study on federal and state 
jurisdiction by the American Law Institute (ALI) contained a proposal to add a provision to the federal 
judicial code to omit from district court jurisdiction “actions arising under the law of any state 
concerning domestic relations.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURT § 1330 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968). In the floor debate, a 
modification was proposed that would have made the provision more specific: it would bar federal 
jurisdiction over “[p]roceedings for divorce, separation, alimony or custody of children where the 
rights sought to be enforced arise under the laws of any state.” 45 A.L.I. Proc. 117 (1969) (remarks of 
Prof. Field, relaying a suggestion by Judge Weinstein). Ultimately the ALI was unable to agree on the 
language or the limits of § 1330, which also included a bar on federal jurisdiction over probate matters, 
competency hearings, and actions arising under workers’ compensation laws, and the entire section 
was omitted. This history is recounted in Atwood, supra note 32, at 573 n.20. 
 215. Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021–22 (3d Cir. 1975).  
 216. See Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 492 (“However dubious its historical pedigree, the domestic relations 
exception is too well established to be questioned any longer by a lower court.”); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 
F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Regardless of the historical inaccuracies and doctrinal distortions that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
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We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations exception, as 
articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the federal courts of 
power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Given 
the long passage of time without any expression of congressional 
dissatisfaction, we have no trouble today reaffirming the validity of 
the exception as it pertains to divorce and alimony decrees and child 
custody orders.217 
Of course, unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court has no need to 
adhere to prior dicta. This is particularly true when, as here, the dicta lack 
any consistent or convincing justification.218 
B. Policy Rationales 
Given the murkiness of the jurisdictional justification for the domestic 
relations exception, the federal courts have asserted a number of policy 
rationales to support their invocation of the exception. They have also 
utilized a number of these rationales when utilizing their discretion to 
abstain in domestic relations cases. Many of these policies are connected 
to principles of federalism and comity, which suggest that the federal 
courts should defer to the state judicial system in areas where the state has 
particular interest, such as domestic relations. However, much of this 
reasoning is circular; the state courts may have a special expertise, interest, 
and tradition in the domestic relations area simply because the federal 
courts have refused to hear these cases. Further, the federal courts sitting 
in diversity would apply state law, and so would be able to take advantage 
of the states’ experience in this area. 
1. State Expertise and Judicial Economy 
In support of maintaining the domestic relations exception, the 
Ankenbrandt Court cited the “special proficiency” possessed by the states 
in the area of domestic relations.219 The state courts have developed 
relationships with local agencies, have access to specialized staff to 
monitor the ongoing compliance of the parties that is often necessary in 
 
 
mark the birth and early years of this exception to diversity jurisdiction, the exception has endured for 
too long for us to abandon it in the absence of contrary action by Congress or the Supreme Court.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 217. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 115–200. 
 219. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704. 
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these cases, and have expertise in this area that the federal judiciary does 
not possess.220 Given these specialized skills and institutions that have 
grown in the state court system over the last century and a half, it is argued 
that judicial economy dictates that the state courts continue to handle these 
cases, rather than attempting to reinvent the wheel in federal court.221  
However, this expertise and these relationships with various 
institutions involved in family law issues developed in the state courts, and 
not in the federal courts, because of the domestic relations exception, and 
are not reasons for maintaining it.222 The federal judiciary is surely capable 
of developing this proficiency and creating the necessary familiarity and 
connections with governmental agencies and other organizations that 
provide services and monitoring in family law cases.223  
Some federal courts have argued that family law issues are simply too 
difficult and delicate to be handled by federal judges. For example in 
Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi,224 where the Sixth Circuit abstained from hearing a 
constitutional claim involving custody procedures, the court stated:  
There are some questions that are too hard and too remote from the 
experience of federal judges and bring home to us again the wisdom 
of the past in giving us a social union with a Federal structure . . . . 
We must rely on a judge in a court of family law with its more 
flexible standards and with the parties before him and their latest 
circumstances in mind to balance the equities and seek 
compromises that best accommodate the interests of the parties.225 
 
 
 220. Id. at 703–04; see also Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F. 2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975) (modern 
rationale for domestic relations exception is that state courts have long experience and expertise in 
family law matters not possessed by federal courts). 
 221. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703–04; see also Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 
1215 (6th Cir. 1981) (Some states have specialized family courts which make them “better suited to 
process the large volume of such cases.”); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(There is “no reason to proliferate the number of available forums” for domestic relations litigation, 
particularly when states have created special family courts “with social work functions and 
facilities.”); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D.Md. 1977) (“Because state courts traditionally 
have adjudicated domestic relations cases, they have developed a proficiency and expertise in the area 
that is almost completely absent in the federal courts.”). 
 222. See Poker, supra note 35, at 161–62 (“[T]his rationale is more a statement about the result of 
the years of application of the exception rather than a justification for it . . . .”).  
 223. See Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, 
Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 220–21 (1995); Kerrie E. 
Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1894 (1996). 
 224. 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 225. Id. at 633. 
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The statement strikes a false chord of humility; federal judges 
frequently utilize their discretion in making difficult decisions and are 
capable of applying this skill to the domestic relations area.226 Moreover, 
to the extent that state family law provides more “flexible standards,” of 
course in a diversity case the federal court would be applying state 
substantive law.227 
2. Overcrowded Federal Dockets  
The federal judiciary has consistently expressed concern over the large 
increase in federal caseloads generally228 and has argued against any 
expansion of federal jurisdiction that would open the “floodgates of 
litigation.”229 Some courts have invoked this concern when justifying the 
domestic relations exception.230 However, the relevant question is how the 
federal dockets compare to those of the state courts, where the domestic 
relations cases are now heard. The total number of federal cases is a “small 
fraction” of the number of cases in the state courts, and state courts bear a 
far greater burden in terms of caseloads.231 Moreover, the state courts 
handling most family law problems have comparatively low financial 
resources to address the extremely high volume of cases.232  
 
 
 226. See Poker, supra note 35, at 162 (There is “simply no reason to believe that federal judges 
would be unable to master the subject of domestic relations.”). 
 227. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938); see Cahn, supra note 35, at 1092 
(Federal courts must decide state law issues in diversity generally, and there is no reason why they 
cannot do so in family law matters.). 
 228. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 57 tbl.3.1, 60–
61 tbl.3.2 (1996) (In 1960, there were 79,200 cases filed in federal district courts and 3,765 appeals 
filed in the federal courts of appeal, while in 1995, the numbers had risen to 283,688 and 49,625, 
respectively.). But see Workload of the Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2006 (reporting a ten percent 
decline in federal district court civil filings in 2005, and a two percent decline in criminal case filings 
in the same period).  
 229. Toby J. Stern, Note, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 377, 379 (2003) (criticizing the “floodgates” argument). 
 230. See, e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D.Md. 1977) (“[T]he Court is unwilling to 
increase the workload of this already overburdened Court by ignoring a rule that has existed for over 
100 years without any intimation of Congressional disapproval.”).  
 231. Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 
619, 655–56 (2001) [hereinafter Categorical Federalism] (comparing annual federal district court 
filings of approximately three hundred thousand to the thirty million cases begun annually in state 
courts).  
 232. In 2005, the federal judiciary received a budget of $5.42 billion. See U.S. Courts, Judiciary 
Budget: Facts and Impact, http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2005.html; see also Elrod, supra note 11, 
at 854 (“The current court system in most states is not prepared to deal with the staggering caseloads 
and the myriad of complex family problems that come before it. Courts dealing with family law issues 
have the greatest burdens and the fewest resources.”). In 2003, state courts reported over 5.5 million 
incoming domestic relations cases, and incoming domestic relations caseloads increased fifteen 
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As a practical matter, abandoning the domestic relations exception 
would not “flood” the federal court system with family law cases. The 
litigants would still need to satisfy the diverse citizenship and amount in 
controversy requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction.233 And, in 
order to preserve institutional integrity, federal courts cannot refuse to hear 
cases for which they have jurisdiction because they are “too busy.”234 
Moreover, refusals of the lower federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction 
granted to them by Congress “blur the separation of judicial and legislative 
powers.”235 
3. Local Interest and Community Values 
The domestic relations exception has been justified by the rationale that 
state courts should retain family law cases because these matters can 
involve value judgments that can best be made locally.236 This rationale 
 
 
percent in the prior ten years. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS & NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT 32–33 (2004). One need only step across Foley Square in New York from the 
marble and wood-paneled federal courthouse to the Manhattan Family Court, brimming with people, 
to feel the palpable difference in resources and caseloads.  
 233. See Cahn, supra note 35, at 1075; see also Atwood, supra note 32, at 627 (arguing that 
limiting abstentions in domestic relations cases “would not transform the federal courts into common 
divorce courts”).  
 234. Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976). See McClellan v. Carland, 
217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910) (By staying a proceeding until a state action was resolved, the federal court 
had “practically abandoned its jurisdiction over a case of which it had cognizance, and turned the 
matter over for adjudication to the state court. This, it has been steadily held, a Federal court may not 
do.”); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1883) (“[T]he courts of the United States are 
bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their 
jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another 
jurisdiction.” (quoting Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1858)); see also Atwood, supra 
note 32, at 574. 
 235. Atwood, supra note 32, at 603–04. This issue of the allocation of jurisdiction between state 
and federal courts has parallels to the concerns that framed the “parity debate” that became a focus of 
federal courts scholars in the 1980s and early 1990s. That debate concerned whether state courts are 
equal to federal courts in their ability to address and vindicate constitutional rights. See, e.g., Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1991); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of 
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543 (1985). However, some of the same issues and assumptions about federal courts come into 
play, such as the relative quality of federal and state court judges. See Chemerinsky, supra, at 603. In 
this context, Martin Redish has argued that federal courts must exercise jurisdiction where they are 
authorized to do so by the general statutory grant, and they should refrain only where a legislative 
intent to deny federal jurisdiction is clear. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 
POLITICAL ORDER 49 (1991); see also Rush, supra note 35, at 20 & n.88 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234–55 (1943); McNeese v. Bd. 
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 n.6 (1963)). 
 236. See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (1995) 
(arguing in support of maintaining state jurisdiction over family law because state entities are best 
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does have a certain amount of weight,237 but the real question is whether in 
fact domestic relations decisions continue to reflect local interests or 
values. Changes in family law that create more consistency and 
uniformity, together with greater mobility of population, continue to 
undermine such arguments.238 Moreover, this argument often is really a 
restatement of the “greater state expertise” rationale; states may have more 
interest in family law cases than federal courts because family law cases 
have not been part of the federal docket.  
In addition, some courts and commentators espousing the “local 
values” justification for the domestic relations exception are critical of 
federal diversity jurisdiction generally.239 However, Congress has long 
refused to eliminate diversity jurisdiction, and its modifications have 
mostly involved raising the amount in controversy requirement.240 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the bias concerns that underlie 
the need for federal diversity jurisdiction.241 And, in family law, “local 
values” can often translate to local bias. The traditional argument that 
federal diversity jurisdiction reduces the potential for bias in litigation 
with out-of-state parties is particularly applicable in domestic relations 
cases, which often involve out-of-state plaintiffs in divorce or custody 
actions who have relocated after marital breakups.242 
 
 
suited to “draw upon community values and norms on the meaning of the good life for families and 
children”).  
 237. Unlike the other rationales, which either employ circular reasoning or are simply thinly 
veiled statements of disdain for family issues, the concept of local values and culture informing the 
standards for family law decision-making has some merit. Custody, abuse, and divorce decisions, for 
example, are impacted by views on morality, parenting, and marriage. Because these views can differ 
widely, it may seem appropriate to have local standards applied to this area of the law. 
 238. See Wand, supra note 59, at 361. Of course, the federal court sitting in diversity would be 
applying state law in these decisions. Moreover, though moral values, and views on parenting and 
marriage, can certainly differ, in our current society it is likely that any locality will contain divergent 
viewpoints. Values are not uniform within each state or local jurisdiction.  
 239. See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 540 & n. 54 
(1989) (citing judges and commentators advocating elimination of diversity jurisdiction); see also 
Cahn, supra note 35, at 1094, 1116 (noting ongoing disapproval of diversity jurisdiction among the 
federal judiciary). 
 240. Cahn, supra note 35, at 111 (noting legislation to limit diversity jurisdiction has been 
introduced in Congress, but never enacted); Friedman, supra note 239, at 540–41. 
 241. See Friedman, supra note 239, at 541 & n.56 (citing decisions). 
 242. See Atwood, supra note 32, at 604 (“[T]he perceived need for a neutral forum may be 
particularly pronounced in a domestic relations context.”); Cahn, supra note 35, at 1118–20 (The 
potential for bias is of particular concern in family law cases—within four years following divorce or 
separation, seventy-five percent of custodial mothers will move at least once); Wand, supra note 59, at 
360 (uniform and federal laws granting full faith and credit to child custody determinations from other 
states were enacted to counter efforts of some parents to avoid an unfavorable custody ruling by 
traveling to a different state to relitigate the case and take advantage of state’s local bias for a parent or 
child now within its borders ). Cahn also argues that “[a]s long as diversity jurisdiction continues to 
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4. “Docket Clutter”243 
The rationale for the domestic relations exception that does not appear 
in court opinions, but which may have contributed to the courts’ 
longstanding adherence to it, is a sense that domestic relations issues are 
not the stuff of which federal dockets are made.244 The concern about 
overcrowded federal dockets may be at least partially due to a concern 
about overcrowding the dockets with these cases.245 As one federal court 
put it, the custody matter at issue was a “sad human drama [that] has 
spilled into federal court,” which is well left in state court’s hands as “this 
area of the law is ill-suited to federal court determinations.”246 Another 
federal court stated, “So long as diversity jurisdiction endures, federal 
courts cannot shirk the inconvenience of sometimes trading in wares from 
the foul rage-and-bone shop of the heart.”247  
This distaste for family law issues is of course not a legitimate rationale 
for refusing to hear these cases and is emblematic of the problem that 
abandonment of the domestic relations exception would help to address.248 
Federal judges do not conceive of their job as handling domestic relations 
 
 
exist, the federal courts’ historical discrimination against domestic relations cannot justify its 
continued exclusion. If diversity jurisdiction is to be limited, limitations should not be based solely on 
bias against the issues and litigants involved in certain cases.” Cahn, supra note 35, at 1122. 
 243. Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1994) (Federal judges 
want to avoid family law cases out of a “sense that this work is insignificant docket-clutter beneath the 
dignity of the federal judge.”). 
 244. See Wand, supra note 59, at 359 (One justification for the exception, “although not expressly 
articulated by federal courts, is evident from reading federal court opinions: the distaste with which 
federal judges view domestic relations disputes and their disinclination to hear these cases.”). 
 245. See Cahn, supra note 35, at 1110 (“The notion that the federal courts should not overload 
their schedules with domestic relations cases implies that these cases are not as important as others 
which should, more appropriately, fill up the federal court dockets.”); Resnik, “Naturally” Without 
Gender, supra note 142, at 1749 (“Dealing with women—in and out of families, arguing about federal 
statutory rights of relatively small value—is not how [federal judges] want to frame their job.”). 
 246. Minot v. Eckhard-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 247. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 248. See Atwood, supra note 32, at 599 (noting that “distaste for the subject matter of a particular 
case is hardly grounds for dismissal”). One possible concern is that the abandonment of the domestic 
relations exception would permit wealthier litigants, who meet the diversity and amount in controversy 
requirements, to proceed in federal court, while relegating the poor to the state system, thereby 
creating disparity in treatment. Of course this separation of litigants occurs in all areas in which some 
parties are able to access federal court through diversity jurisdiction, and it is not a basis for making an 
exception for domestic relations cases. The difference in resources available to state and federal court 
systems is clearly an issue that deserves attention, but it should not be grounds for keeping all 
domestic relations litigants out of federal court. Moreover, by hearing domestic relations cases, the 
federal judiciary would become more invested and focused on the problems attendant in this area. It is 
my belief that the national attention to family law cases this would create could only help state courts 
obtain the resources that this area warrants. 
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issues. If that is so, then a change in their conception of their job would 
promote a greater respect for the issues that arise in family law cases, and 
the litigants that bring these claims. 
C. The Obligation to Renounce the Domestic Relations Exception 
None of the policy rationales offered for maintaining the domestic 
relations exception are persuasive. If greater state experience exists in this 
area, it is because of the long existence of the exception, and therefore this 
experience cannot justify its continuation. Concerns regarding a strain on 
federal court resources are not convincing, because they do not compare to 
the burden currently placed on the state courts. The policy rationales most 
clearly reveal a frank bias against handling these cases in federal courts. 
The courts’ use of abstention in domestic relations cases often relies on 
these same unconvincing policy rationales. There also are other reasons to 
reject the broad use of abstention in domestic relations cases. The Court 
has not adhered literally to Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Cohens v. 
Virginia that if the Court has jurisdiction, it must exercise it.249 Referring 
to Cohens in Massachusetts v. Missouri,250 the Court noted that the 
Cohens statement  
is not universally true but has been qualified in certain cases where 
the federal courts may, in their discretion, properly withhold the 
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon them where there is no 
want of another suitable forum . . . . Grounds for justifying such a 
qualification have been found in ‘considerations of convenience, 
efficiency, and justice’ applicable to particular classes of cases.251  
Yet the Court consistently has made clear that discretionary refusal to 
hear cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction must be 
unusual.252 As the Court stated in Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States,253 the appropriateness of abstaining must be 
evaluated against “the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts 
 
 
 249. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1858); see supra text accompanying note 6. 
 250. 308 U.S. 1 (1939). 
 251. Id. at 19 (quoting Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 131 (1933)) (citations 
omitted); see also Vestal & Foster, supra note 59, at 2–4 (discussing Cohens and exceptions to it). 
 252. See, e.g., Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234–35 (1943) (Unless there are 
exceptional circumstances, federal courts should not refuse jurisdiction, and to do so “merely because 
the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the 
highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act.”). 
 253. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
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to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”254 Moreover, the abstention 
doctrines have been controversial precisely because they undermine the 
very reasons federal jurisdiction was conferred in the first place and deny 
plaintiffs properly in federal court the right to proceed in the forum of their 
choice.255 
It is possible that there are situations in which the use of an abstention 
doctrine by a federal court in a domestic relations case is appropriate.256 
However, if abstention is utilized, it must be because the principles of the 
doctrine are met, and not because the case involves domestic relations 
matters.257 The fact that, because of the domestic relations exception, the 
states have traditionally handled these types of cases cannot then be used 
to justify abstention due to a strong state interest in the area. Such a basis 
for abstention is just like the policy rationale for the domestic relations 
exception that justifies the exception on the grounds of greater state 
expertise or interest. The federal courts should not let the impact of the 
domestic relations exception broaden their use of abstention doctrines; 
doing so would perpetuate the same illegitimate “ongoing state interest” 
rationale.  
The Supreme Court should abandon the domestic relations exception 
because there simply is no convincing legal or policy rationale for its 
existence. In addition, by maintaining the exception the Court keeps alive 
a doctrine rooted in the denial of women’s equality and perpetuates in 
modern form a belief that “women’s issues” are not fit for national 
attention.  
The nineteenth-century dichotomy between public and private spheres 
has been discussed extensively by feminist scholars.258 In this 
 
 
 254. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.  
 255. See Friedman, supra note 239, at 535, 538–41 (contrasting the Court’s endorsement of 
diversity jurisdiction to avoid state court bias with its employment of federal abstention doctrines in 
several diversity cases). Friedman makes the same observation concerning the Court’s “selective 
amnesia” in ordering lower courts to abstain in federal question cases, “forgetting how the cases . . . 
originally came to fall within federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 538–39. The Court originally construed 
federal statutes to confer federal jurisdiction out of concern that state courts could not protect federal 
rights, but in abstention cases, the Court “denied such concern, vigorously asserting state sensitivity to 
claims of federal rights.” Id. 
 256. See Atwood, supra note 32, at 614 (arguing that Younger principles should apply to a federal 
court plaintiff seeking intervention in a pending state custody dispute).  
 257. See id. Atwood argues that in the context of a federal court plaintiff seeking to intervene in a 
pending state custody case, abstention is warranted “by the procedural posture of the case and the 
extraordinary nature of the requested relief, not by the domestic relations subject matter of the 
litigation.” Id.  
 258. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1207, 1207 (1999) (The nineteenth century framed family and state as “separate spheres,” so that 
family was a sphere of privacy in which the public sphere, the state, rarely intruded.); Susan Moller 
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construction, the public sphere, the world of political and economic 
participation, was reserved for men, while the private sphere of family and 
home was the world to which women were confined. This framework can 
describe the dichotomy between the federal and state courts as well. In 
relegating certain family law issues to the state courts, “the Court echoes 
the outmoded dichotomy between a public sphere (the marketplace, the 
federal courts) and a private sphere (the family, the state courts).”259 As 
Judith Resnik has put it, jurisdiction has gender, and “whenever power is 
being allocated between state and federal courts, one must ask not only 
how women are treated, but how the allocation affects our understanding 
of the problems that belong to women and to men.”260 
By discarding the domestic relations exception, the Court would 
achieve both tangible and symbolic results. The federal courts are 
perceived as superior to their state counterparts, both in terms of the 
quality and prominence of its judges, and the importance of the cases they 
consider.261 By definition, federal courts operate on a national stage. A 
focus by the federal judiciary on domestic relations matters would make a 
powerful statement about the value of these issues to our society.262  
However, the attitude of the federal judiciary toward women’s issues, 
an attitude that both created and sustained the domestic relations 
 
 
Okin, Gender, the Public and the Private, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 67, 69 (David Held ed., 
1991) (The continuation of the public/private dichotomy “enables theorists to ignore the political 
nature of the family, the relevance of justice in personal life, and, as a consequence, a major part of the 
inequalities of gender.”); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 979 (2002) (The struggle for women’s suffrage 
involved more than political equality, and opponents invoked the “separate spheres” argument, which 
women would violate if permitted to participate politically.).  
 259. Cahn, supra note 35, at 1101; see also Elizabeth S. Saylor, Federalism and the Family After 
Morrison: An Examination of the Child Support Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 81 (2002) (Federal courts have used the domestic relations exception to 
refuse to hear any case involving the family, or simply women.). 
 260. Resnik, Reconstructing Equality, supra note 15, at 417. 
 261. Id. at 408 (“Jurisdictions have hierarchies, and . . . in this country, federal jurisdiction is 
assumed to be a mark of a matter’s import.”); Cahn, supra note 35, at 1105 (“[I]n the world of federal 
and state courts, state courts are ranked second.”); Maloney, supra note 223, at 1902 (Federal courts 
have superior resources, which in turn, can lead to higher-caliber judges.). 
 262. Maloney, supra note 223, at 1902; Cahn, supra note 35, at 1075 (noting “rhetorical 
significance” of recognition that “families are a national issue”); Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender, 
supra note 142, at 1699 (“Because the federal courts claim to be and are understood as the place in 
which the national agenda is debated and enforced, women must insist that our presence be recorded 
and that we not be summarily sent elsewhere.”). Of course, Congress would have the power to 
reinstate the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction by statute. However, it is highly 
unlikely that after a removal of the exception by the Court, there would be the political will to enact 
legislation that affirmatively excluded domestic relations cases, a large proportion of which involve 
women, from federal court. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1441 Sack book pages.doc10/2/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1492 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1441 
 
 
 
 
exception, would not disappear with its abandonment.263 In Part IV, I 
suggest that the Supreme Court’s treatment of domestic violence may 
reflect the same attitude, and it may contribute to the denial of full access 
to federal courts for women. 
IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CITIZENSHIP 
The domestic relations exception continues to impact our view of the 
importance of “women’s issues,” even after it has outlived its origins in 
official inequality for women. This is apparent in the way that the 
Supreme Court has addressed domestic violence and battered women’s 
access to courts to seek redress for their injuries. There is a direct 
connection between domestic violence and the lack of equality for 
women.264 In addition, the inability of battered women to seek remedies 
through public institutions, such as the courts, also impacts women’s full 
participation as citizens.265  
 
 
 263. Supreme Court case law demonstrates that the perspective that underlies the domestic 
relations exception has permeated several areas of federal law. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (domestic relations exception as “prudential” limitation on Article III 
standing); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186 (1988) (finding no private implied federal cause 
of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) because no evidence of such intent by 
Congress, and “[i]nstructing the federal courts to play Solomon where two state courts have issued 
conflicting custody orders would entangle them in traditional state-law questions that they have little 
expertise to resolve[,] . . . a cost that Congress made clear it did not want the PKPA to carry”); 
Lehman v. Lycoming County, 458 U.S. 502 (1982) (dismissing habeas corpus action of mother 
seeking to regain custody of children from foster care; habeas statute should be used only where 
“federal interest in individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism” concerns, and this 
family matter did not rise to that level); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (holding Iowa’s 
residency requirement for divorce did not infringe the constitutional right to travel because the state 
had a strong interest in regulation of domestic relations that was “virtually exclusive” to the states); see 
also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that standard 
of review in termination of parental rights proceedings should be determined by states, as domestic 
relations is an “area [that] has been left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good 
reason”). 
 264. See Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O’Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 2003 SUP. 
CT. REV. 357, 445 (Domestic violence impacts not only individual women, but “[i]n the aggregate, 
battering is a major source of the subordination of women.”).  
 265. See KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 155 (2003) 
(Absence of a public response erodes the social contract that is the basis of citizenship and fails to 
honor the right of victims to protection by the state.); Karst, supra note 264, at 445 (Lack of state 
intervention to protect against private violence is a “massive disempowerment of women as a group, 
not only denying them liberty but excluding them from the fundamentals of equal citizenship.”); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 692 (2000) (By 
recognizing violations against women as violations of the law, women gain access to real citizenship.). 
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A. Domesticating Domestic Violence: The Violence Against Women Act’s 
Civil Rights Provision and United States v. Morrison 
There was an explicit connection between the endorsement of 
coverture and domestic violence in the law of the nineteenth century. 
Because under coverture a husband was responsible for his wife’s actions, 
he had the right of “chastisement,” to conform her conduct so that he 
would not be held liable. The North Carolina Supreme Court expressed 
this concept in the 1864 opinion of State v. Black:266 “A husband is 
responsible for the acts of his wife, and he is required to govern his 
household, and for that purpose the law permits him to use towards his 
wife such a degree of force as is necessary to control an unruly temper and 
make her behave herself.”267 This right to control was directly connected 
to the marriage bond. In Black, the prosecutor argued that because the 
husband and wife were living separately, the husband’s right of 
chastisement should not attach.268 The court rejected that point because the 
couple had made simply a private agreement to live separately; only if 
they had obtained legal recognition of their separation, through a divorce 
“from bed and board,” would this argument apply.269 Otherwise, “[t]he 
husband is still responsible for her acts, and the marriage relation and its 
incidents remain unaffected.”270 Therefore, domestic relations law and the 
legal treatment of domestic violence were integrally related. As women 
became legally invisible upon marriage, so did the violence against them 
at the hands of their husbands.  
These principles also justified a prohibition on seeking court redress for 
this violence. Because domestic violence, as long as not excessive, was 
viewed as a necessary right of a husband responsible for his wife’s actions, 
it should be kept, with other intimate family matters, away from public 
view. The opinion in Black exemplified beliefs about the role of judicial 
review of domestic violence:  
[T]he exposure of a scene like that set out in this case can do no 
good. In respect to the parties, a public exhibition in the Court 
 
 
 266. 60 N.C. (1 Win.) 266 (1864). 
 267. Black, 60 N.C. (1 Win.) at 267. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *444 (“For, 
as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of 
restraining her.”). 
 268. Black, 60 N.C. (1 Win.) at 268. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id; see also Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 306 (1877) (“The legal character of an act of 
violence by husband upon wife and of the consequences that flow from it, is fixed by the [marital] 
condition of the parties at the time the act is done.”).  
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House of such quarrels and fights between man and wife, widens 
the breach, makes a reconciliation almost impossible, and 
encourages insubordination; and in respect to the public, it has a 
pernicious tendency; so, pro bono publico, such matters are 
excluded from the Courts, unless there is a permanent injury or 
excessive violence or cruelty indicating malignity and 
vindictiveness.271  
Domestic violence epitomized activity that should remain in the “private 
sphere.”272  
When the formal constraints of coverture had ended, the belief that 
domestic violence should not be addressed by public institutions, 
including the criminal justice system or the courts, continued until very 
recently.273 For the past twenty years, the conception of domestic violence 
as a private “family matter” has been rejected, at least as a matter of 
theory. However, this view continues to be demonstrated in the current 
treatment of domestic violence by the Supreme Court, and it is 
exemplified by the Court’s denial of access to the federal courts for 
women seeking redress for the violence perpetrated against them by 
intimate partners. Just like the domestic relations exception, the current 
handling of domestic violence is working to exclude “women’s issues” 
from the federal courts and national attention.  
As part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), comprehensive 
legislation to address domestic violence,274 Congress included a provision 
that created a private cause of action against any person who committed a 
“crime of violence motivated by gender” and allowed any person injured 
by such a crime to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 
injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief.275  
 
 
 271. Black, 60 N.C. (1 Win.) at 268. Unless the violence by the husband is excessive, “the law 
will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain. It prefers to leave the parties to 
themselves, as the best mode of inducing them to make the matter up and live together as man and 
wife should.” Id. at 267. 
 272. See Fineman, supra note 258, at 1216. 
 273. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic 
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1661–66.  
 274. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-22, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (codified in 
scattered sections of titles 18, 28, and 42 of the U.S. Code). 
 275. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2006). There is extensive scholarly literature discussing both this 
provision and United States v. Morrison, the case that ruled it unconstitutional, and it is not my 
purpose here to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the provision or the case. See, e.g., Sally F. 
Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of 
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (2002); Julie Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic 
Violence Law Reform, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 417 (2003); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); Judith 
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Despite the fact that no intimate or family relationship between the 
parties was required in order to bring an action under the civil rights 
provision, from the start it was linked to family issues. During the drafting 
of the civil rights provision, there was concern that plaintiffs would be 
able to join family law matters, such as divorce, to a federal civil rights 
claim and establish an end-run around the domestic relations exception.276 
The report of the ad hoc committee of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States that had been assembled to study the civil rights provision 
expressed concern that the provision would “embroil the federal courts in 
domestic relations disputes.”277 Chief Justice Rehnquist echoed this 
concern in his 1991 report on the federal judiciary, stating that the civil 
rights remedy “could involve the federal courts in a host of domestic 
relations disputes.”278 In response to this opposition, the final version of 
the Act explicitly prohibited the use of supplemental jurisdiction to join 
divorce, alimony, marital property, or child custody claims to a case 
brought under the civil rights provision.279  
Meanwhile, the constitutionality of the VAWA civil rights provision 
was brought into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Lopez, which limited the scope of congressional authority to 
legislate under the Commerce Clause.280 Most striking, the Lopez Court 
raised the specter of federal attempts to legislate in the area of family law. 
If limits were not placed on Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause, the majority reasoned, the required connection of an activity to 
interstate commerce could become weak enough to permit federal 
 
 
Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 231. My interest is in understanding the “domestic 
relations” framework in which the Court viewed the provision. 
 276. See Resnik, Reconstructing Equality, supra note 15, at 402 & n.39 (citing Violence Against 
Women: Victims of the System, Hearings on S. 15 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
314–317 (1991) (statement of Hon. Vincent L. McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices) 
(“[I]t can be anticipated that this right will be invoked as a bargaining tool within the context of 
divorce negotiations and add a major complicating factor to an environment which is often 
acrimonious as it is.”)). 
 277. Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence 1 (Sept. 
1991), quoted in Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender, supra note 142, at 1687. 
 278. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE 
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 3.  
 279. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (e)(4) (2006). The provision states:  
Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be construed, by reason 
of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States 
jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, 
equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree. 
Id. 
 280. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Congress had stated that it based its authority to enact the VAWA 
provision on the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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encroachment on areas of clear state authority, such as family law: “Under 
the dissent’s rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rearing 
as ‘fall[ing] on the commercial side of the line’ because it provides a 
‘valuable service—namely, to equip [children] with the skills they need to 
survive in life, and more specifically, in the workplace.’”281 Considering 
the regulation of family law an area within Congress’s authority seemed so 
obviously wrong to the Court that it was used to demonstrate the absurd 
lengths to which the Commerce Clause power could extend if limits were 
not placed on Congress.282 Notably, even the Lopez dissent distinguished 
activities such as “marriage, divorce, and child custody” from the area that 
Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause.283 
In United States v. Morrison,284 the Court echoed its language in Lopez 
and argued that if it failed to place real limits on congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause, there would be nothing to stop Congress 
from regulating in clear areas of state concern, such as family law, “since 
the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and child-bearing on the national 
economy is undoubtedly significant.”285 The Court then explicitly 
connected the civil rights provision to family law: “Congress may have 
recognized this specter when it expressly precluded § 13981 from being 
used in the family law context. Under our written Constitution, however, 
the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a matter of 
legislative grace.”286 The Court then went on to state that “[t]he 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what 
is truly local.”287  
In finding that the civil rights provision was not authorized under the 
Commerce Clause, the Court characterized the provision as a type of 
family law, and therefore, only local in scope.288 By doing so, the Court 
demonstrated both that it continued to conceptualize family issues as a 
 
 
 281. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (alteration in original).  
 282. See Dailey, supra note 236, at 1789; Morgan, supra note 11, at 195. 
 283. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that the specific law at 
issue in Lopez demonstrated a particular connection between education and the national economy 
because gun possession was such a well documented threat to the educational process. Id. Maloney, 
supra note 223, at 1907–08 (noting that both the majority, in dicta, and the dissent suggested that 
family law issues fall outside Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause since they are 
traditionally handled under state law). 
 284. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 285. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16.  
 286. Id. at 616. 
 287. Id. at 617–18. 
 288. See Siegel, supra note 258, at 1029 (arguing that the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis in 
Morrison “invokes separate spheres discourse to identify markets as of ‘national concern’ and families 
as a matter of ‘local concern’”). 
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subject not meant for federal courts, and that it viewed any issues 
predominantly affecting women as equivalent to “domestic relations.”289 
In enunciating these views, the Court precluded plaintiffs seeking to 
redress injuries due to gender-motivated violence from litigating in federal 
court.290 The principles motivating the domestic relations exception 
continued, albeit in a different form. 
B. Domestic Violence and Access to the Federal Courts: Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales 
Even as some elements of coverture were breaking down, the legal 
system continued to keep a firm grip on women’s access to the courts. 
This is nowhere more true than in women’s attempts to seek redress for 
the violence inflicted upon them by their husbands, because claims of 
domestic violence threatened the core of the traditional legal relationship 
between husband and wife.  
1. Access to the Courts: Thompson v. Thompson 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. Thompson291 
exemplifies its response when issues of coverture, domestic violence, and 
women’s equality converge. In Thompson, the Court considered whether a 
wife could sue her husband in tort for personal injury.292 Under the system 
of coverture, there was no question that a married woman and her husband 
could not make an enforceable contract with each other or sue each other 
in tort, because as one legal unit, they would be suing themselves. By the 
time of the Thompson case, some jurisdictions had passed statutes that 
altered and destroyed some of the basic constraints of coverture.293 The 
Court in Thompson was called upon to construe such a statute enacted by 
Congress for the District of Columbia, and in so doing determine if the 
 
 
 289. See Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender, supra note 142, at 1760 (noting “the troubling 
equation of ‘women’ with ‘families’ and the accompanying assumption of the absence of family 
matters from the federal courts”); see also Goldfarb, supra note 275, at 67. 
 290. See Resnik, Reconstructing Equality, supra note 15, at 397 (“Advocates of women’s equality 
. . . sought to make the physical safety and dignity of women an element of national citizenship rights. 
But they were told that it was jurisdictionally improper in this federation to seek such recognition.”); 
see also Linda C. McClain, Discrimination and Inequality: Emerging Issues Toward a Formative 
Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1234 (2000) (In striking down 
VAWA’s civil rights provision, the Court “failed to accept the link between violence against women 
and their status as equal citizens under the federal Constitution.”). 
 291. 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
 292. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 614. 
 293. Id. at 615.  
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law permitted a wife to sue her husband for torts committed by him on her 
person.  
The Court held that the legislation did not provide such a right to 
married women.294 Though the law stated that “[m]arried women shall 
have power . . . to sue separately . . . for torts committed against them, as 
fully and freely as if they were unmarried,” the Court held that this was 
limited to suits by married women against individuals other than their 
husbands.295 Congress could have enacted a law to permit women to sue 
their husbands, but “such radical and far-reaching changes should only be 
wrought by language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of 
the legislative intention.”296 The Court further explained why allowing 
such actions might be a harmful policy: 
[It] would . . . open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts 
of one spouse against the other, and bring into public notice 
complaints for assault, slander and libel, and alleged injuries to 
property of the one or the other, by husband against wife or wife 
against husband. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would be 
promotive of the public welfare and domestic harmony is at least a 
debatable question. The possible evils of such legislation might well 
make the lawmaking power hesitate to enact it.297 
The dissent argued against the majority’s reading of the statute, and 
would have found that, because the provision contained no qualifying 
language, married women were permitted to sue their husbands.298 
 
 
 294. Id. at 616. 
 295. Id. at 616–17. The Court explained that the intent of the statute was to permit a married 
woman to sue separately without the joinder of her husband, as had been previously required under 
coverture, not to permit her to sue her husband. Id. at 617; see also Faris v. Hope, 298 F. 727, 728–30 
(8th Cir. 1924) (reversing actual and punitive damages award to wife in libel suit against her husband 
because Missouri Married Women’s Act did not permit married woman to sue her husband in tort, 
though in this case divorce had been issued and was pending on appeal at the time of suit).  
 296. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 618.  
 297. Id. at 617–18 (emphasis added). As the lower court’s opinion put it, the married women’s 
statutes that had been passed were designed “to further and promote the property rights and interests of 
married women, but not to interfere with or undermine the conjugal relations.” Thompson v. 
Thompson, 31 App. D.C. 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1908). In ruling that the wife could not sue her husband 
for a personal tort under the statute, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia further stated: “In 
our desire to accord to woman every right to which she is entitled, let us not undermine the basis of 
society by disregarding the sanctity of the home.” Id. at 560; see also Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 
F.2d 178, 179 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding interspousal tort immunity justified by furthering a policy of 
domestic harmony and minimizing the danger of fictitious, fraudulent, and trivial claims). 
 298. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 621–22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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However, the dissent did not disagree with the majority about the potential 
harm of allowing such actions.299  
The Court does not tell us much about what brought Jessie Thompson 
to bring an assault and battery claim against her husband, Charles.300 From 
the dissent, we learn that: “The declaration contains seven counts. The 
first, second and third charge assault by the husband upon the wife on 
three several days. The remaining counts charge assaults by him upon her 
on different days named—she being at the time pregnant, as the husband 
then well knew.”301 
Given “such atrocious wrongs” by Charles, the Thompson Court tried 
to mitigate the harshness of its result by finding alternative remedies that 
Jessie could seek.302 The Court stated that Jessie could “resort to the 
criminal courts, which, it is to be presumed, will inflict punishment 
commensurate with the offense committed.”303 The “it is to be presumed” 
language here is telling. It has been well documented that prosecution of a 
criminal case involving domestic violence is at best inconsistent today, 
would have been unlikely through the mid-1980s, and in 1910, would have 
been virtually unheard of.304 The Court also suggested that she might sue 
for divorce, separation, and for alimony, and that “[t]he court in protecting 
her rights and awarding relief in such cases may consider, and, so far as 
possible, redress her wrongs and protect her rights.”305 Again, the “so far 
as possible” language reveals that the Court itself is not convinced that its 
own suggested remedy would be feasible. Even assuming that she could 
easily sue for divorce and receive alimony, any financial award would be 
for ongoing support and would not encompass compensation for past 
injury, for which she had claimed damages in the amount of $70,000.306 
Finally, the Court suggested that Jessie could “resort to the chancery court 
 
 
 299. Id. at 621 (“[I]f, as suggested, [permitting wife to sue her husband would] be undesirable on 
grounds of public policy, it is not within the functions of the court to ward off the dangers feared or the 
evils threatened simply by a judicial construction.”). 
 300. The first names of the parties are provided in the lower court’s decision. Thompson v. 
Thompson, 31 App. D.C. 557, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1908). 
 301. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619–20. The lower court opinion states only that the seven counts 
claim seven separate assaults by the husband. Thompson, 31 App. D.C. at 558. 
 302. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 617. This is similar to the Court’s suggestion in Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales that Jessica Gonzales seek state tort remedies, after denying her the right to seek federal 
protection. And, as in Castle Rock, the alternative remedies suggested by the Court are hardly adequate 
substitutes. See infra text accompanying notes 329–34. 
 303. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619. 
 304. See Sack, supra note 273, at 1661–65, 1668–74 (discussing the history of domestic violence 
criminal justice policies). 
 305. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619. 
 306. Id. at 614.  
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for the protection of her separate property rights.”307 However, the Court 
quickly noted that it was not ruling on whether such lawsuits by a wife 
would be permitted.308 In any case, the tort damages sought by the wife 
here were for injuries against her person and did not relate to protection of 
her separate property.309  
None of the remedies suggested by the Court, to the extent they were 
even accessible by a married woman, came close to providing an adequate 
substitute for a tort action against an abusive husband, from which the 
Court had barred her.310 Over ninety years later, in Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, the Court again examined the remedies available to a woman 
who had been abused by her husband.311 
2. Castle Rock v. Gonzales 
In 2005, the Supreme Court considered the issue it faced in Thompson 
in a modern guise. While Thompson involved the right of a woman to 
challenge domestic violence in an action against her husband, Castle Rock 
v. Gonzales concerned the right of a woman to challenge such violence in 
a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a city and its police department 
for failing to obey the law and arrest her husband.312 Though the contexts 
are somewhat different, the issue of a woman’s access to the courts to 
address domestic violence remains the same. The Castle Rock opinion 
suggests that the fight for access to federal courts is located not just in the 
 
 
 307. Id. at 619 (citation omitted). 
 308. Id. (“Whether the wife alone may now bring actions against the husband to protect her 
separate property, such as are cognizable in a suit in equity when brought through the medium of a 
next friend, is a question not made or decided in this case.”) (citations omitted). 
 309. See Bagley v. Forrester, 53 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1931) (noting the distinction between 
suits by wife against husband which involve her separate property, and those that involve personal 
injury). The Bagley court quoted Cooley on Torts: “When the wife is by statute given full control over 
property acquired by her, the marital relation will not protect the husband against an action for 
unlawfully interfering with her property, but under such a statute the wife cannot maintain an action 
against her husband for a personal injury.” Id.  
 310. See Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (N.J. 1978) (noting that “no court in this day 
and age subscribes seriously” to the “alternative remedy” theory that Thompson advanced as 
justification for retaining interspousal tort immunity, and that neither criminal law nor divorce equates 
to a “civil right to redress and compensation for personal injuries”). Interspousal tort immunity is not 
an artifact from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many states maintained such immunity 
for personal torts well into the twentieth century. See Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (noting that a majority of states at that time retained the ban on interspousal tort actions). As 
of 2003, the doctrine continued to exist in four states. See Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 487 
(Md. Ct. App. 2003). 
 311. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 312. Id. at 750.  
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fate of the domestic relations exception, but also in another field 
traditionally linked to women, domestic violence.  
In Castle Rock, Jessica Gonzales claimed that her due process rights 
were violated when Castle Rock police officers failed to respond properly 
to her repeated reports that her estranged husband was violating the terms 
of a domestic violence protection order.313 The case concerned whether a 
person who had obtained a protection order had a constitutionally 
protected property interest, and therefore a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
in having police enforce the order when they had probable cause to believe 
it had been violated.314 
We have more details about Jessica Gonzales’s tragedy than we did 
about the abuse of Jessie Thompson. Gonzales’s husband, from whom she 
was separated, took their children around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. one evening 
when they were playing outside her home, in violation of the terms of the 
protection order she had obtained against him.315 When she realized that 
her children were missing and suspected that her estranged husband might 
be involved, Gonzales repeatedly called police to ask them to enforce her 
protection order.316 The police department ignored her requests, stating 
that there was nothing they could do and telling her to call the police later 
in the evening if the children had not returned home.317 Even after 
Gonzales talked to her husband on his cell phone at 8:30 p.m. and learned 
that he had the children at a nearby amusement park, the police refused to 
go to the scene to apprehend her husband and locate the children.318 When 
the children had not been returned by midnight, she went to her husband’s 
apartment and called police again at 12:10 a.m. She was told to wait there 
for an officer to arrive. When no one came, Gonzales proceeded to the 
police station at 12:50 a.m. and submitted an incident report.319 Again, 
nothing was done. At approximately 3:20 a.m., her husband arrived at the 
police station and opened fire with a handgun he had purchased earlier that 
 
 
 313. Id. at 751.  
 314. Id. at 750–51.  
 315. Id. at 753. The order, which had been served on the husband, required him to stay at least one 
hundred yards from the family home at all times. Id. at 751. In the final order, the court had given the 
husband the right to visit with his three daughters on alternative weekends, for two weeks in the 
summer, and “upon reasonable notice,” a mid-week dinner visit “arranged by the parties.” The 
modified order permitted him to visit the home to collect the children for such “parenting time.” Id. 
The husband had not contacted Gonzales nor made any arrangements to pick up the girls on the 
evening in question. Id.  
 316. Id. at 751. 
 317. Id. at 753. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 753–54. 
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evening. Police returned fire, killing him. Police then looked inside his 
truck, where they found the bodies of all three daughters, whom he had 
already murdered.320  
The Colorado statute regarding protection orders stated: “A peace 
officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order,” 
and  
[a] peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical 
under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained 
person when the peace officer has information amounting to 
probable cause that . . . [t]he restrained person has violated or 
attempted to violate any provision of a restraining order; and . . . 
[t]he restrained person has been properly served with a copy . . . 
or . . . has received actual notice of the existence and substance of 
such order.321  
In addition, the protection order form issued against Mr. Gonzales 
contained a warning to respondents, as well as a notice to law enforcement 
officials that explained the requirement of arrest in the same language as 
the statute.322 
Gonzales argued that both the explicit terms of the protection order, as 
well as the Colorado statute under which it was issued, made clear that 
police were required to make an arrest when they had probable cause to 
believe that the person against whom the order was issued had violated its 
terms. If the person could not be located, police were required to seek a 
warrant for his arrest. These requirements, it was argued, gave Gonzales a 
property interest in the order’s enforcement; when the Castle Rock police 
department did not undertake this enforcement, they deprived her of her 
procedural due process rights.323 
 
 
 320. Id. 
 321. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6803.5(3) (1999), cited in Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 758–59. 
 322. The protection order form stated: 
NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS: YOU SHALL USE EVERY 
REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL 
ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED 
PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE 
THAT THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED . . . ANY PROVISION OF THIS 
ORDER . . . . 
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 752. 
 323. The protection order, which had been served on Gonzales’s husband, stated that a knowing 
violation of a restraining order is a crime, and that respondent could be arrested without notice “if a 
law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that you have knowingly violated this order.” Id.  
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found that no such property 
interest was created.324 Therefore, Gonzales had no claim against the 
Castle Rock police department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.325 The result itself 
may not be much of a surprise, given the Court’s constricted view of 
plaintiff’s claims in civil rights actions in the past several years.326 
However, the concerns motivating the Court are highly reminiscent of 
those that have maintained the domestic relations exception. Moreover, 
what is striking is how the Court, and particularly Justice Scalia, the 
author of the opinion, ignored their own theories of statutory interpretation 
in order to arrive at this result.  
The Court feared that if the Fourteenth Amendment were interpreted to 
permit this type of federal claim, the federal courts would be reduced to 
handling what should be state tort matters. The Fourteenth Amendment 
should not be treated as “‘a font of tort law.’”327 Similar to the rationale 
espoused for keeping domestic relations cases out of federal court, the 
government and its amici raised concerns that permitting Gonzales’s claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would deluge the courts with constitutional 
claims, as well as impose huge costs on local governments.328 
 
 
 324. Id. at 768. In so doing, the Court diverged from its statement in Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), that a property interest is “defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law,” by suggesting in dicta not 
only that Colorado had not created an entitlement to police enforcement of a protection order, but also 
that a person could never have a property interest in police protection from harm by a private third 
party. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 208, 209, 213 (2005) 
[hereinafter Leading Cases]. The Court argued that this type of entitlement had no ascertainable 
monetary value, and, because a private individual’s interest in protection was only incidental to 
governmental action taken against a third party (the violator of the order), it was not a recognized 
property interest for procedural due process analysis under O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 
447 U.S. 773 (1980). See Leading Cases, supra, at 211–12. Interestingly, the Court’s argument that a 
claim for police protection could not be a recognized property interest because it had no “ascertainable 
monetary value” is reminiscent of the Court’s early argument that domestic relations matters such as 
divorce could not meet the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction because they had no 
pecuniary value. Both arguments kept the claims at issue out of federal court. 
 325. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768. 
 326. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 327. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768 (citation omitted). 
 328. Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 36–37, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-
278) (discussing the “flood of claims” that would burden municipal governments); Brief of Amici 
Curiae International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3–4, Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278). See id. at 9–10 (“[T]he federal courts would see their 
dockets swell because there would be no reason and no incentive for citizens . . . to use the state courts 
to press a tort claim.”); see also G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic 
Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 138–39 (2005) 
(commenting on this amici argument). The Castle Rock Court did not create a “domestic violence 
exception” to federal court jurisdiction, nor did it invoke the domestic relations exception. Yet it 
stretched to find a rationale for barring federal civil rights claims involving domestic violence that 
would have the effect of these exceptions. This is much like the reasoning of Justice Blackmun’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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At the conclusion of the opinion, the Court suggested that Gonzales 
might find remedies in state law, noting that, although § 1983 does not 
“create a system by which police departments are generally held 
financially accountable for crimes that better policing might have 
prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a system under 
state law.”329 The Court also noted that Gonzales’s complaint alleged 
willful and wanton conduct by the police, for which government 
employees could not claim immunity under Colorado law.330  
However, as in Thompson, the suggested state remedies were not viable 
alternatives to the claim denied by the Court. As amici for Gonzales 
argued, the Colorado statute had been enacted because state tort law was 
inadequate to provide protection to domestic violence victims; tort law 
“focused on compensation following violence rather than procedural 
protection to guard against violence in the first instance.”331 Moreover, the 
state tort law presented substantial hurdles. It required a heightened 
showing of intent, “willful and wanton” conduct with respect to the 
resulting harm—here the death of the Gonzales children. In fact, the 
Colorado courts “have frequently rejected state law tort suits alleging that 
wrongful police inaction that eventually led to criminal conduct was 
sufficiently ‘willful and wanton’ to overcome qualified immunity.”332 The 
state tort law’s causation element also made it difficult to prevail in claims 
against the police; “even if a defendant has acted wrongfully, no tort 
liability attaches to the wrongful conduct if the injury of which the 
plaintiff complains could not have been reasonably foreseen by the 
defendant.”333 Because in domestic violence cases there is always an 
intervening violent act by the abuser, the distance between the police 
 
 
concurrence in Ankenbrandt, where he rejected the notion of a domestic relations exception but argued 
for the use of an abstention doctrine to arrive at the same result. See supra text accompanying notes 
50–57. 
 329. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768–69. 
 330. Id. at 769 n.15 (noting that Colorado statutory immunity for government employees does not 
apply to conduct that is “willful and wanton”).  
 331. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Ass’n of Women Lawyers et al. in Support of 
Respondent at 3, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278). Moreover, the existence 
of state tort remedies does not bar a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 4. 
 332. Id. at 11. Under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the plaintiff has to prove only that the police had a 
“willful and wanton” state of mind with respect to depriving her of her right to adequate process 
before, here, denying enforcement of her restraining order. Id. at 11 n.3. 
 333. Id. at 12. 
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inaction and its ultimate effect “raises doubts as to whether the injury at 
issue could reasonably have been foreseen.”334 
The Court’s interpretation of the provision at issue is inconsistent with 
its general theory of statutory interpretation. The reliance on a statute’s 
plain meaning is an aspect of statutory interpretation that is well settled in 
the Court. As Justice Blackmun stated in his Ankenbrandt concurrence, 
“[t]his Court has recognized that in the absence of a ‘clearly expressed’ 
intention to the contrary, the language of the statute itself is ordinarily 
‘conclusive.’”335 Justice Scalia is well known for his view that the first and 
primary source of statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of a 
statute’s text.336 In Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union 
Planters Bank, Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in interpreting 
a bankruptcy statute.337 He stated, “[W]e begin with the understanding that 
Congress ‘says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there.’”338 Further, “when ‘the statute’s language is plain, “the sole 
function of the courts”’—at least where the disposition required by the text 
is not absurd—‘“is to enforce it according to its terms.”’”339 In addition, 
 
 
 334. Id. In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the only causation that needs to be proved is between police 
inaction and the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process, a more direct and 
clear connection. Id. at 12–13 n.4. 
 335. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 707 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); 
see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (Thomas, J.) (“[W]hen the words 
of a statute are unambiguous, then . . . [the] ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”) (citations omitted).  
 336. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 
1511 (1998) [hereinafter The Unknown Ideal?] (“Scalia’s main point is that a statutory text’s apparent 
plain meaning must be the alpha and the omega in a judge’s interpretation of the statute.”). For Justice 
Scalia, the plain meaning of a statute is determined according to the words’ ordinary usage. Id. 
(“[P]lain meaning is that which an ordinary speaker of the English language—twin sibling to the 
common law’s reasonable person—would draw from the statutory text.”). Justice Scalia frequently 
refers to dictionary meanings in order to determine a word’s common usage. See, e.g., MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–28 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (referring to several 
dictionaries to determine meaning of the word “modify” in a statute, and discounting a different 
meaning from a single dictionary that contradicts the meaning from all other dictionaries); see also 
David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His 
Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1388–90 (1999) (discussing, in constitutional 
context, Justice Scalia’s use of textualism, including reliance on “ordinary social and dictionary 
meaning of individual words” as most important, and often decisive, in interpretation, and his 
“theoretical bias toward defining words narrowly”). 
 337. 530 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2000) (Scalia, J.). 
 338. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. at 6 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).  
 339. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). In Ron Pair 
Enterprises, Justice Scalia had joined the majority opinion which stated that the plain meaning of a 
statute “should be conclusive” except in the “‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute 
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” 489 U.S. at 242 
(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  
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Justice Scalia rejected the position that the Court may assess the “relative 
merits of different approaches” to, in this case, bankruptcy issues: “It 
suffices that the natural reading of the text produces the result we 
announce. Achieving a better policy outcome . . . is a task for Congress, 
not the courts.”340  
It is hard to imagine any language in the Colorado protection order 
statute that could make it plainer that arrest upon probable cause to believe 
that a protection order had been violated, or if impractical, then application 
for an arrest warrant, was mandatory. Yet Justice Scalia seemingly ignored 
the explicit language of the statute in Castle Rock, arguing that “[w]e do 
not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement 
of restraining orders mandatory. A well-established tradition of police 
discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”341 
He argued that therefore “a true mandate of police action would require 
some stronger indication from the Colorado Legislature than ‘shall use 
every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order.’”342 
It is consistent with Justice Scalia’s theory of statutory interpretation to 
consider the specific words of the provision at issue in context when 
necessary in order to determine their meaning. As William Eskridge has 
noted, though Justice Scalia starts with the plain meaning, he will consider 
what interpretation is most consistent with the statute as a whole, whether 
similar language has been used elsewhere in the statutory code, how such 
language has been interpreted, and which rules of grammar and syntax are 
implicated.343 Assuming he felt it was necessary in order to determine the 
 
 
 340. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. at 13–14. Justice Scalia’s method of statutory 
interpretation is rooted in his view of the separation of powers: “[I]t is simply incompatible with 
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law 
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.” Antonin 
Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997); see also Eskridge, The Unknown Ideal?, supra note 336, at 
1511 (“[T]he constitutional role of the legislature is to enact statutes, not to have intent or purposes, 
and the role of the courts is to apply the words and only the words, without regard to arguments of 
fairness or political equilibrium.”). 
 341. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005).  
 342. Id. This avoidance of the plain language of the text is reminiscent of the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute in Thompson that was contrary to its plain meaning. See supra text 
accompanying notes 295–96. 
 343. Eskridge, The Unknown Ideal?, supra note 336, at 1512. See William D. Popkin, An 
“Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 
1148 (1992) (discussing Justice Scalia’s “treatment of multiple statutes as a single document written 
by an ideal drafter who integrates them into a super-text” so that he can apply maxims of language 
usually applied to a single statute to multiple statutes, where, for example, similar terms in different 
statutes are given the same meaning). Popkin argues that such an interpretation does not describe the 
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meaning of “shall” in the provision, if he had followed his own theory, 
Justice Scalia would have looked to the whole statute of which this 
provision was a part. Here, the provision mandating arrest for violations of 
domestic violence protection orders was part of an omnibus bill directed at 
enhancing protections for domestic violence victims.344 This 1994 bill 
included not only the provision on enforcement of protection orders, but 
also, among other things, the creation of a centralized protection order 
registry, and requirements for entering new orders so that law enforcement 
could easily access information about existing orders.345 The statute also 
created good faith immunity for police officers who arrest a person in 
violation of a protection order, thus encouraging officers to make these 
arrests without fear of liability if later the order turns out not to be valid.346 
Therefore, if Justice Scalia had followed his own theory, he would have 
observed that the statute of which this provision was a part was directed 
toward increased enforcement of domestic violence laws and protection of 
victims. 
Moreover, the plain text, as well as the history of the statute, 
“demonstrates that the General Assembly recognized traditional police 
discretion and specifically rejected its applicability to protection order 
violations.”347 Following his own method, Justice Scalia would not have 
analogized the mandatory domestic violence statutes to a “tradition” of 
police discretionary enforcement of criminal statutes mandating arrest 
generally.348 
 
 
actual workings of a legislature, and that people do not “routinely integrate language usage over time 
with the care of an ideal drafter.” Id. at 1149. 
 344. Brief of Peggy Kearns et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7, Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278) [hereinafter Brief of Peggy Kearns] (noting that the bill 
included provisions which toughened civil and criminal penalties to hold batterers accountable and 
deter them from committing future acts of violence). 
 345. See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 22, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) 
(No. 04-278).   
 346. Id. 
 347. Brief of Peggy Kearns, supra note 344, at 11.  
 348. Though the legislative history of the Colorado statute overwhelmingly demonstrates that the 
legislature intended the mandatory language to mean what it said, Justice Scalia believes that 
legislative history is not an appropriate source for statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Zedner v. United 
States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I 
believe that the only language that constitutes ‘a Law’ within the meaning of the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause of Article 1, § 7, and hence the only language adopted in a fashion that entitles it 
to our attention, is the text of the enacted statute.”); Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bradley Nigh, 
543 U.S. 50, 70, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have often criticized the Court’s use of legislative 
history because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism. The Congressional Record or committee 
reports are used to make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were spoken or written 
by others (individual Members of Congress, congressional aides, or even enterprising lobbyists.”)). 
But see W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112–13 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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Justice Scalia did concede that the dissent was correct that in the 
specific context of domestic violence, mandatory arrest statutes have been 
found in some States to be more “mandatory” than traditional mandatory 
arrest statutes.349 But he then proceeded to an argument that was not about 
the meaning of the statute, but instead concerned the substantive law: that 
the “mandate” to police was not clear, and so could not create an 
entitlement.350 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia appeared to abandon some core 
principles of his statutory interpretation theory in order to reach the 
conclusion that Jessica Gonzales had no federal cause of action against the 
police.351 In doing so, the Court denied battered women access to the 
 
 
(objecting to the “literal approach” to statutory interpretation, in which the judge puts on “thick 
grammarian’s spectacles” and “ignore[s] the available evidence of congressional purpose”); see also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 655 (1990) (arguing that Justice 
Scalia will look at whether the meaning of a term is consistent with other parts of a statute or other 
terms in similar statutes, but not at whether the meaning is consistent with legislative history). 
 349. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761–62 (2005). 
 350. Justice Scalia argued that because the statute did not make clear what police must do when a 
defendant was not present on the scene, there was too much police discretion involved to create an 
entitlement. Id. at 764. However, the statute is completely clear on conduct required if it is 
“impractical” to make an arrest—i.e., if the defendant cannot yet be located—they must seek an arrest 
warrant; there is no discretion involved. Justice Scalia goes further to argue that even if the statute 
made enforcement mandatory because of its domestic violence context, “that would not necessarily 
mean that state law gave respondent an entitlement to enforcement of the mandate.” Id. at 764–65. Of 
course, it is obvious that the protection order is issued for the purpose of protecting a specified person 
or persons, and it was on this group that the benefit was conferred. 
 351. In addition to the question of statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia also refused to defer to 
the Tenth Circuit as the appropriate court to determine the state law of Colorado, a state within its 
jurisdiction. An important issue in the case was whether under Colorado law the state statute 
concerning enforcement of protection orders created an “entitlement” to such enforcement for subjects 
of such orders, such as Jessica Gonzales. Under well settled case law, the Supreme Court gives 
deference to the interpretation of state law made by the circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction over 
the state whose law is at issue and should overturn that interpretation only where it is clearly wrong or 
otherwise seriously deficient. See, e.g., Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 774–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998). Here, the Tenth Circuit had interpreted the 
Colorado law to create such an entitlement. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756 (majority opinion). Justice 
Scalia, a proponent of judicial restraint, might be expected to accept such deference. At a minimum, if 
he was not comfortable with the Tenth Circuit’s mode of decision making, he might have certified the 
question of state law to the Colorado Supreme Court, an alternative proposed by Justice Stevens in his 
dissent. Id. at 776–77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This would comport with Justice Scalia’s view of 
federalism and deference to states’ interpretations of their own laws. As the dissent also noted, “by 
certifying a potentially dispositive state-law issue, the Court would adhere to its wise policy of 
avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of difficult questions of constitutional law.” Id. at 778. 
However, Justice Scalia did neither of these things. Though acknowledging the presumption of 
deference to the views of a federal court as to the law of a state within its jurisdiction, he stated that the 
presumption can be overcome, and “we think deference inappropriate here,” because the Tenth Circuit 
did not “draw upon a deep well of state-specific expertise.” Id. at 757 (majority opinion). The dissent 
noted that Justice Scalia did not even attempt to demonstrate that the en banc majority in the Tenth 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
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courts in two basic ways. First, by failing to recognize that a domestic 
violence protection order creates a property interest requiring government 
enforcement, the Court undermined the right of domestic violence victims 
to gain meaningful access to state courts.352 For such access to have 
meaning there must be a governmental obligation to implement and 
enforce court orders. In these cases, post-incident remedies such as 
bringing contempt charges against the abuser would not be adequate, and 
police action to enforce the order is the only alternative.353 Second, the 
Court’s holding blocked battered women from using the federal courts to 
hold local governments accountable for their failures to enforce. By failing 
to recognize the right of domestic violence victims to bring 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 actions in these circumstances, the Court stated that domestic 
violence is not the business of the federal courts. 
The domestic relations exception and the inequality for women that it 
embodies are historically connected to our courts’ approval and tolerance 
of, and then inattention to domestic violence. But the exception is not a 
relic of history, and it continues to have a powerful hold on our conception 
of what is worthy of public focus today. In a federal court system without 
the domestic relations exception, where issues central to women were also 
a focus of federal attention, the rationales of Morrison and Castle Rock 
could not be sustained. The Court could not designate domestic violence 
as a matter of purely local concern, nor could it diminish government 
accountability for the enforcement of domestic violence laws. By 
eliminating the domestic relations exception, we could begin to dismantle 
its effects, including the refusal to recognize national remedies for 
domestic violence. 
CONCLUSION 
The domestic relations exception cannot be sustained on constitutional, 
statutory, or historical grounds, and the policy rationales invoked to 
support it have little substance. The exception’s origins may be better 
explained by the principle of coverture that denied married women the 
ability to establish diversity jurisdiction. Though coverture has ended, 
these origins make obvious the impact that the continuation of the 
 
 
Circuit was “clearly wrong” and argued that this showing could not be made. Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 352. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of 
Respondent at 13–15, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278).  
 353. Id. 
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domestic relations exception has on the citizenship rights of women.354 
Without full access to federal courts, women cannot enjoy the full political 
and civil participation that equal citizenship entails. Though the Supreme 
Court had the occasion to definitively dispose of the domestic relations 
exception last term in Marshall v. Marshall, it failed to do so.355 If the 
Court is to fully recognize women’s equality, it must take this step. 
Moreover, the limit on women’s equality that underlies the domestic 
relations exception persists in other forms. The Court’s denial of federal 
remedies for domestic violence exemplified in Morrison and Castle Rock 
perpetuates the belief that women cannot lay full claim to the rights of 
citizenship.  
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,356 the 
Court addressed the connection of coverture to domestic violence, and its 
impact on women’s ability to participate in society as equal citizens. The 
Court struck down a state provision that required a woman to notify her 
spouse of her choice to have an abortion, arguing that this requirement 
would severely impact victims of domestic violence, who may fear 
additional abuse if they inform their husbands.357 For these women, the 
notification provision would be tantamount to a requirement that they 
obtain their husbands’ consent before making these decisions.358 And to 
require a husband’s consent would take the Court back toward the 
principles of coverture. 
The Court in Casey explained how the treatment of battered women 
affects the equality of all women. It noted that “not so long ago,” the Court 
affirmed the common law principle that a married woman had no legal 
 
 
 354. Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and 
Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1618–19, 1632 (2001) [hereinafter Domain of Civic Virtue]. 
The law of domestic relations was called by the law “the law of baron et feme,” literally the law of 
lord and woman. LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE 
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 12 (1998). As Linda Kerber has explained, coverture “excused married 
women from civic obligation because married women owed their primary obligation to their 
husbands.” Id. at 304. 
 355. 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006). See supra text accompanying notes 1–9.  
 356. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 357. Id. at 895. 
 358.  
Whether the prospect of notification itself deters such women from seeking abortions, or 
whether the husband, through physical force or psychological pressure or economic coercion, 
prevents his wife from obtaining an abortion until it is too late, the notice requirement will 
often be tantamount to the veto found unconstitutional in Danforth. 
Id. at 897. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976), the Court 
had found a spousal consent requirement unconstitutional. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/3
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existence separate from her husband.359 Even after married women had 
gained a legal existence, they were still relegated to a narrow scope of 
activity: “Only one generation has passed since this Court observed that 
‘woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life,’ with 
attendant ‘special responsibilities’ that precluded full and independent 
legal status under the Constitution.”360 If a husband could effectively veto 
his wife’s choice, there is no reason why the state could not require a 
married woman to get the permission of her husband to use a post-
fertilization contraceptive, to engage in any conduct that could cause risks 
to the fetus, or to do anything that could affect her reproductive organs 
before she is actually pregnant.361 The Court concluded: “A State may not 
give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over 
their children.”362  
In this part of the Casey opinion, the Court found that the Constitution 
does not permit abusers to bar battered women from exercising their 
rights. To hold otherwise would open the door to the regressive treatment 
of all women and would embrace a view of the status of all married 
women that is “repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and the 
nature of the rights secured by the Constitution.”363  
The Casey Court clearly understood that the repression of battered 
women is closely related to the restraints our justice system continues to 
place on women’s equality generally.364 The Court must return to that 
understanding. The overruling of the domestic relations exception is a 
critical step in the process toward equality. The Court cannot allow the 
legacy of the exception, as revealed in the denial of federal rights to 
 
 
 359. Casey, 505 U.S. at 896–97 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1872)). 
 360. Id. at 897 (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).  
 361. Id. at 898. 
 362. Id. In his concurrence in Casey, Justice Blackmun made the direct connection between a 
woman’s right to reproductive choice and equality: “A State’s restrictions on a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality.” Id. at 928 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). He 
continued by arguing that “[t]his assumption—that women can simply be forced to accept the ‘natural’ 
status and incidents of motherhood—appears to rest upon a conception of women’s role that has 
triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.  
 363. Id. at 898. 
 364. See KERBER, supra note 354, at 307 (stating that the Casey decision striking down the 
spousal notification requirement “is the moment when coverture, as a living legal principle, died”); 
McClain, Domain of Civic Virtue, supra note 354, at 1634 (“[T]he Court made clear that our 
constitutional order cannot permit states to allow households to reinstate coverture; for principles of 
individual liberty and equality directly conflict with patriarchy as a mode of family and societal 
governance.”); see also Karst, supra note 264, at 414 (A women’s control over her reproductive rights 
was necessary not only for women to participate in economic life, but also because it “offered a path to 
self-realization.”). 
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victims of domestic violence, to endure, if it is committed to a view of 
women as equal citizens. 
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